APPENDIX 2

REGISTERED REFUGEE POPULATION OF REFUGEE TENTED VILLAGES IN PAKISTAN: OCTOBER, 1989

	RTV	REFUGEE POPULATION INDIVIDUALS	FAMILIES
NWFP	**ABBOTTABAD**		
	BASSU MERA 1	7611	1317
	BASSU MERA 2	10039	1716
	GHAZI 1	7421	1264
	GHAZI 2	10427	1690
	PADHANA 1	8809	1383
	PADHANA 2	9057	1388
	PADHANA 3	8450	1283
	PANIAN 1	7045	1216
	PANIAN 2	7406	1248
	PANIAN 3	7278	1271
	PANIAN 4	6600	1136
	PANIAN 5	7317	1124
	PANIAN 6	7605	1346
	PANIAN 7	11956	1885
	PANIAN 8	7306	1242
	PANIAN 11	5616	945
	PANIAN 12	6307	1070
	PANIAN 13	7205	1197
	TOTAL (18)	143455	23842
	BAJAUR		
	BAICHINA	5010	737
	DAMMADOLA 1	9158	1297
	DAMMADOLA 2	8536	1171
	DAMMADOLA 3	8798	1294
	DAMMADOLA 4	7756	1192
	DAMMADOLA 5	9141	1473
	DAMMADOLA 6	5510	785
	DAMMADOLA 7	7381	1033
	JEHANGIR ABAD	9468	1384
	JEHANGIR ABAD?	1437	1997
	JEHANGIR ABAD 1	8003	1104
	JEHANGIR ABAD 2	7161	1011

KIRALA	8771	1264
KHAZANA	8045	1321
NAWAB ABAD	5330	835
NAWAGAI	1268	1717
RAGHAGAN	6958	951
RASHAKAI 1	6651	972
RASHAKAI 2	6554	926
SHULTAN	7253	931
UMARI	9467	1268
YOUSAF ABAD 1	9502	1450
YOUSAF ABAD 2	5942	837
YOUSAF ABAD 3	4347	666
ZOOR BANDAR	6657	932
TOTAL (25)	198456	28548

BANNU		
BAKKAKHEL	13634	1839
BIZEN KHEL	8344	1085
GAMBILA	12438	1824
GANDI KHAMKHEL	8222	1271
KURRAM GARHI	9149	1258
NAURANG	9263	1348
SAIDGAI	12173	1964
TOTAL (7)	73223	10589

CHITRAL		
KALAKATAK 12	13783	2487
NAGAR RTV 13	6854	1202
SHIDI RTV 11	17692	2904
TOTAL (3)	38329	6593

DIR		
BARAWAL	8488	1552
BARARI	7552	1340
CHAKDARA	11735	2184
DOABA	4165	736
KOTKAI	5527	957
MAYAR	10708	1795
TIMER	13624	2560
TOOR 1	9351	1576
TOOR 2	8849	1484
TOOR 3	9495	1533
TOTAL (10)	89496	15717

D.I. KHAN		
DABARA	7700	1253
DARABAN	6692	986
GIRSAL	10351	1426
KURAI	12216	1731
NAIWALLA	3826	551
PUSHA PUL	7605	1197
RAKHZANDANI	3810	585
RATAKULCHI	9168	1351
TANK 1	6070	840
TANK 2	5103	773
TANK 3	15082	2230
TOTAL (11)	87623	12923

KOHAT		
CHICHANA	11070	1525
DOABA	14790	2082
DARASAMAND 1	22601	2640
DARASAMAND 2	16305	2164
GAMKOL 1	6874	1068
GAMKOL 2	13509	2017
GAMKOL 3	14384	2062
GHULAM BANDA	8037	1184
JERMA	10779	1442
KAHAI 1	15354	2200
KAHAI 2	15818	2120
KATA KANRI	6742	924
KOTKI	11052	1476
LAKHTI BANDA	15344	2105
OBLAN	14547	2137
SHIN DAND	4126	657
THAL 1	13867	2024
THAL 2	7260	2413
TOTAL (18)	232459	32240

KURRAM		
AHMADI SHAMA	11317	1749
ARAWALI	5681	742
ASGHARO 1	7365	937
ASGHARO 2	9306	1288
ASGHARO 3	10233	1364
ASGHARO 4	6421	746
BUSHERA	12886	1681
BESSU	7364	1347
CHAPPARI	10024	1337
DURRANI	7646	1113
GARZANDI	10896	1298
GAWAKI	11321	1615
GHUND/BACHALORS	1500	1500

GHUZ GARI	6039	772
KHAPYANGA 1	9992	1621
KHAPYANGA 2	9836	1631
KHAPYANGA 3	17173	2635
KHAPYANGA 4	9126	1518
MATASANGAR	14465	1810
MUZAFFAR KOT	8419	1042
NEW BAGZAI 1	17526	2434
NEW BAGZAI 2	13628	2128
NEW BAGZAI 3	9636	1471
OLD BAGZAI	15522	2198
PARACHINAR 1	8491	1182
PARACHINAR 2	12544	1798
SARGHURGA	11400	1486
SHAHSHU	13817	1955
SHABAK	8756	1248
SATIM 1	11441	1512
SATIM 2	5653	780
TINDO 1	10341	1470
TINDO 2	7048	989
ZAMO	15233	2365
TOTAL (34)	347776	50762

MALAKAND

PALAI 1	19486	2681
PALAI 2	13200	2178
ZANGAL PATAI	22461	3076
TOTAL (3)	55147	7935

MANSHERA

BRAIRY	9679	1343
HAJIABAD	6788	1054
HARIMERA	8822	1204
ICHRION	6957	1067
KHAKI	10546	1314
KOTLIAN	6568	1017
NEELORE	7511	1091
RATTA DEPOT	7625	1014
SHEIK ABAD	7357	1083
TOTAL (9)	71853	10187

MARDAN

BAGHICHA 1	5699	921
BAGHICHA 2	4741	785
BARAKAI 1	4007	719
BARAKAI 2	4489	706

BARAKAI 3	5061	822
BARAKAI 4	4934	776
BARAKAI 5	6137	980
BARAKAI 6	5515	872
BARAKAI 7	5546	911
BARAKAI 8	5093	854
BARAKAI 9	4986	829
BARAKAI 10	6154	985
FAZAL 1	5360	881
FAZAL 2	9009	1794
GANDAF	8164	1525
JALALA 1	9734	1668
JALALA 2	12031	1969
TOTAL (17)	106659	17997

MOHAMAD

EKKA GOUND 1	7560	1308
EKKA GOUND 2	7995	1274
TOTAL (2)	15555	2582

NORTH WAZIRISTAN

B.ZIARAT	3968	573
BANGIDARA	6723	996
BHATTI 1	6534	766
BHATTI 2	4886	629
CHASHMA	10543	1438
DARMANDI	7445	1124
DARPAKHEL 1	10311	1592
DARPAKHEL 2	10652	1495
DUWAGHUNDI	4075	644
GUDIWALA	4040	559
HAMZOONI 1	5724	753
HAMZOONI 2	5609	712
MATCH FACTORY	8398	1100
MIR ALI	7449	974
MOHD. KHEL 1	4823	656
MOHD. KHEL 2	5479	749
NARIDUG	12261	1774
QATAB KHEL	8413	1114
SEERAI	4274	625
SPINWAM	9201	1451
SHER KHEL	7810	1186
STAYANEE	12851	1971
TABBI	12723	1937
VILL. M. SHAH	9943	1388
TOTAL (24)	184135	26206

ORAKZAI		
GHILJO 1	8099	1199
GHILJO 2	5319	784
TOTAL (2)	13418	1983

PESHAWAR 1		
BADABER 1	9551	1411
BADABER 2	9040	1340
BADABER 3	7363	1141
BADABER 4	7726	1160
BADABER 5	11624	5029
BADABER 6	13474	2181
HARYANA 1	7242	1188
HARYANA 2	5507	1011
KACHA GARHI 1	9777	1490
KACHA GARHI 2	8381	1272
KACHA GARHI 3	4947	746
KACHA GARHI 4	11429	2143
KACHA GARHI 5	10335	1550
KACHA GARHI 6	10249	2370
KABABIAN 1	9902	3102
KABABIAN 2	6969	1028
KABABIAN 3	7518	1528
KABABIAN 4	8668	1210
MACHANI	17379	10030
MUNDA 1	8927	1605
MUNDA 2	9846	1686
MUNDA 3	10649	1757
MUNDA 4	11161	1861
MUNDA 5	12278	2145
MUNDA 6	5809	1021
NASIR BAGH 1	10256	1551
NASIR BAGH 2	9962	1482
NASIR BAGH 3	5653	818
NASIR BAGH 4	7461	1130
NASIR BAGH 5	8819	1331
NASIR BAGH 6	5624	908
NASIR BAGH 7*		
TOTAL (32)	284527	58225

PESHAWAR 2		
AZAKHEL 1	5400	2126
AZAKHEL 2	8710	1375
AZAKHEL 3	6127	895
DAG BESHUD 1	6018	856
DAG BESHUD 2	5575	810
HAJIZAI	5402	874
HAWAI 1	8561	1490
HAWAI 2	10232	1818
HAWAI 3	9369	1643

HAWAI 4	7178	1290
HAWAI 5	5345	970
HAWAI 6	7162	1269
HAWAI 7	6654	1219
HAWAI 8*		
JALOZAI 1	8162	1413
JALOZAI 2	7414	1112
JALOZAI 3	7900	1181
JALOZAI 4	10786	3837
JALOZAI 5	9833	1449
JALOZAI 6	6836	1049
JALOZAI 7	7552	1207
KHAZANA	9575	1451
KHESHKI 1*		
KHESHKI 2*		
M. KACHORI 1	9525	1769
M. KACHORI 2	11585	1777
M. KACHORI 3	12054	1817
NAGUMAN	4052	668
SHAMSHATOO 1	8014	1294
SHAMSHATOO 2	11022	3488
SHAMSHATOO 3	6605	1097
UTMANZAI	4996	783
TOTAL (33)	227644	42027

SOUTH WAZIRISTAN

AZAM WARSAK	9093	1473
BAGHAR	9241	1621
SARA KANDA	7981	1400
ZARINOOR 1	8788	1422
ZARINOOR 2	11932	1634
ZARMELANA	10849	1620
TOTAL (6)	57884	9170

SWAT

KOGA 1	7021	1265
KOGA 2	7042	1272
TOTAL (2)	14063	2537

BALUCHISTAN **CHAGAI**

AMIN ABAD	15036	2516
AMRI	11117	1664
CHAGAI	11811	2011
GIRDI JUNJLE 1	16333	2691
GIRDI JUNJLE 2	9734	1503
GILLAH CHAH	4638	780

LIJI KAREZ 1	10189	1797
LIJI KAREZ 2	10926	1825
OKAR 1	9048	1464
OKAR 2	12165	1942
PESHOOK	13458	2374
PESTI 1	9315	1607
PESTI 2	8306	1459
SHIREEN AAB	8585	1369
SHIREEN A.MODEL	8324	1464
OMER CHAH	5947	945
ZAR CHAH	7055	1167
TOTAL (17)	171987	28578

CHAMAN

ABSHAR	4793	660
DARRAH	19421	3016
MAKU KACH	4223	567
ROGHANI	8548	1187
TER TANGI	4503	621
TOTAL (5)	41488	6051

GULISTAN

GULISTAN 1	13681	2138
GULISTAN 2	14454	2246
J. PIRALEZAI 1	19377	3095
J. PIRALEZAI 2	12749	1851
J. PIRALEZAI 3	11652	2094
J. PIRALEZAI 4	15099	2199
J. PIRALEZAI 5	12085	1715
J. PIRALEZAI 6	13530	2108
KILLAH ABDULLAH	5897	888
PIR ABAD	21925	3346
SARNAN 1	14423	2263
SARNAN 2	11497	1782
SARNAN NEW	19309	2578
TOTAL (13)	185678	28303

MUSLIM BAGH

MALGAGI 1	9642	1711
MALGAGI 2	9964	1682
MALGAGI 3	8658	1376
MALGAGI 4	12561	2191
MALGAGI 5	14515	2165
TOTAL (5)	55340	9125

	PISHIN		
	CHOWKI 1	15284	2183
	HADIRA 1	9509	1698
	HADIRA 1A	12354	2043
	HADIRA 2	8534	1284
	JAGGI FARAKHI	3442	500
	KAREZ 1	19884	3045
	KAREZ 2	8140	1269
	KACH 1	10777	1704
	KACH 2	12974	1726
	KILLAH HAJIKHAN	8531	1407
	SURKHAB 1	9348	1465
	SURKHAB 2	12146	1831
	SURKHAB 2 NEW	18186	2713
	ZIARAT	19826	2778
	TOTAL (14)	168935	25646
	QUETTA		
	M. KHEL 1	21436	3527
	M. KHEL 2	21488	3989
	M. KHEL 3	11625	1979
	M. KHEL 3A	12608	2090
	M. KHEL 4	17530	2829
	M. KHEL 5	19332	3257
	M. KHEL 6	17479	2804
	TOTAL (7)	121498	20475
	ZHOB/LORALAI		
	GHAZGAI MINARA 1	13625	2276
	GHAZGAI WALL 1	10063	1435
	GHAZGAI TAK	6992	1076
	KATWAI 1	10422	1820
	KATWAI 2	9996	1886
	SPADAR 1	10636	1855
	SPADAR 2	10578	1772
	ZAR K. KAREZ 1	11098	1568
	ZAR K. KAREZ 2	10899	1539
	ZAR K. KAREZ 3	10791	1721
	TOTAL (10)	105100	16948
PUNJAB	**MIANWALI**		
	KOTCHANDNA 1	11100	1853
	KOTCHANDNA 2	11037	2025
	KOTCHANDNA 3	11071	1892
	KOTCHANDNA 4	10972	1860
	KOTCHANDNA 5	11084	1936

Refugees' attitudes towards displacement are the second of the home-related factors identified in this model (Figure 1.4). Kunz (1981:44) classified the refugees as either "reactive fate-groups" or "purpose groups". The common attribute of "reactive fate-groups" is their reluctance to flee, until suddenly confronted with an intolerable situation and one without solution. Typically, these people are refugees of war, *coup d'etats*, and expulsions, or national refugees who identify with the majority position ("majority-identified"). "Purpose group" refugees differ significantly, being generally comprised of persons alienated because of their ardent quest for a new society, "which derives its framework from minority ideologies inconsistent with those current in the home country" (Kunz, 1981:45). The "purpose-group" refugee is often difficult to distinguish from the voluntary migrant, except that departure is forced as a result of harassment and fear of persecution.

The third of Kunz's "home-related factors" is labelled "Ideological-National Orientation Abroad" and consists of six groups. Common to all is the emphasis on refugee motivations in asylum. Kunz (1981:45) found that some "self-alienated" refugees were able to establish idealist colonies inspired by ideology and therefore forget problems present in the old country, whereas others become activists in exile and promoted revolution in the homeland. The ideological orientation among "majority-identified" refugees Kunz (1981:46) considered to be uncertain and changeable. At one extreme are the "eager assimilationists", content to integrate themselves into their new homes and abandon past struggles; at the other end are the "restoration activists", who shared a sense of cause with most of their compatriots who remained behind. In between are two further groups: those labelled as "retired hurt" and subsequently too passive to stir up any revolutionary feelings; and those "integration-seeking realists" who pursue an "integrated accommodation with the host society which is consistent both with their past and present roles" (Kunz, 1981:46).

"Host-related" factors are the third set that Kunz (1981:46) felt influenced the exile and resettlement of refugees (Figure 1.4). Of the three groups that make up this set, the most influential is cultural compatibility between the backgrounds of those in exile and the society. Integration into the new socioeconomic situation is accelerated through increased ability to share language, values, traditions, lifestyles, religion, political views, food habits, and interpersonal relations. Ultimately, as Kunz (1981:46) recognized, refugee settlement is determined by the population policies of the host country and the willingness to accept those in flight. Whereas some countries may regard refugees as valued immigrants able to foster population growth through large intakes, others with high population densities may be less sympathetic. The social receptiveness of countries of asylum was the final influential factor, with (Kunz, 1981:46) arguing that refugees would experience greater pressures for conformity and assimilation in monistic societies, which would less likely represent hospitable havens. Pluralistic and multi-ethnic societies, with their lower expectations of conformity, were

KOTCHANDNA 6	11118	1982
KOTCHANDNA 7	10594	1838
KOTCHANDNA 8	10831	1719
KOTCHANDNA 9	11029	1901
KOTCHANDNA 10	11019	1843
KOTCHANDNA 11	11237	1878
DARATANG 12	14976	2470
KOTCHANDNA 13	12044	2592
KOTCHANDNA 14	11181	2143
KOTCHANDNA 15	11129	2212
KOTCHANDNA 16	9154	1595
TOTAL (16)	179576	31739
NWFP TOTAL (256)	**2241702**	**359906**
BALUCHISTAN TOTAL (71)	**850026**	**134215**
PUNJAB TOTAL (16)	**179576**	**31739**
PAKISTAN TOTAL (343)	**3271304**	**525860**

* Population of these new RTVs was not provided in GOP statistics. Population numbers given in brackets were obtained during the field study.

Source: GOP, 1989.

APPENDIX 3

THE INTERVIEW GUIDE

The following questions were used as a guide in interviews with the Afghan refugee population.

A. NAME OF RTV.
B. NUMBER OF RTV.
C. INTERVIEW NUMBER.
D. DATE OF INTERVIEW.

1. Name of Respondent
2. Number of persons in household
3. Age of respondent
4. Marital Status
5. Place of Birth
6. Tribal Affiliation
7. Refugee Registration
8. Reasons for non-registration
9. Political Affiliation
10. 1978 Occupation
11. 1990 Occupation
12. Place of residence in Afghanistan
13. Date (year) left Afghanistan
14. Deatils of family's departure from Afghanistan
15. Why respondent left Afghanistan
16. Special event which prompted departure
17. Length of journey
18. Difficulties encountered on journey
20. Place of Arrival in Pakistan
21. Why choose this village
22. Been to this area previously
23. Move to other areas
24. Will you return to Afghanistan
25. When will you return
26. What conditions will be necessary for your return
27. Where will you return to
28. Who make the decision for you to return
29. Conditions in RTV
    Food
    Housing
    Health
    Education

30. Number of ration cards in household
31. Rations
    - Wheat
    - Sugar
    - Milk
    - Tea
    - Oil
    - Kerosene
32. Ration sufficiency

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more likely to welcome refugees and assimilation would be easier because an immigrant nucleus already exists.

DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH

Of the different approaches towards understanding involuntary population movements, those by Petersen, Eichenbaum, and Richmond each fail to contribute very much additional insight into forced migration. Their basic concern is with the characteristics of and differences between migrant categories and not with the investigation of root causes which underlie refugee movements. Consequently, none of these was found to be a satisfactory foundation upon which a theory of refugee migration could be built.

Kunz (1973:131), in contrast, has identified a number of displacement criteria, including form and timing, together with various "home-related" and "host-related" elements, which influence flight. His theory not only considers the migration of refugees in terms of the conventional labels of push and pull, but also introduces the notions of pressure, permit and plunge. Finally, from both his original and his more recent contributions, Kunz was able to produce a list of predictive statements.

Despite the conceptual efforts that Kunz has made toward understanding refugee flight and resettlement, his work has been subjected to criticism. Yet, no more satisfactory explanation of involuntary population movement has been proposed. How appropriate then, is this theory as an explanation of contemporary refugee movements? To answer this question, this thesis will investigate a current refugee exodus to determine whether the theoretical components of the Kunz model are evident, and if the main postulates of the theory can be sustained.

Testing the theoretical propositions of Kunz's theory with data from some particular society is based on Mitchell's (1983:207) recognition of the validity of the case study as an appropriate method of social analysis. For the case study is

> the documentation of some particular phenomenon or set of events which has been assembled with the explicit end in view of drawing theoretical conclusions from it. ... What is important is not the content of the case study as such but the use to which the data are put to support theoretical conclusions (Mitchell, 1983:191).

Eckstein (1975:94-123 cited in Mitchell, 1983:195) argues there are five different ways in which a case study can contribute to theoretical thinking. Of these five, the "crucial case study" is the most relevant for testing Kunz's theory, in that it can "... offer the circumstances which enable the analyst to reject some theoretical proposition or ... to support it when the circumstances appear to be loaded against it" (Mitchell, 1938:197). Consequently, "a detailed study of the case will then enable the analyst to relate the events to the theoretical proposition."

For several reasons, the migration of refugees from Afghanistan to Pakistan was selected as the particular situation to examine Kunz's

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arguments. First, they represent the world's largest population in asylum and, with nearly six million refugees outside of Afghanistan, they are the largest involuntary movement to have occurred in recent times. Secondly, the overwhelming majority are still refugees with approximately two million living in Iran and four million in Pakistan. While there has been some integration of refugees into these host communities, Afghan refugees remain a highly distinctive population with as many as ninety percent of those in Pakistan residing in villages established by the government.

Thirdly, few refugee flows have extended over such a long period and the Afghan exodus has continued for thirteen years, a lengthy time frame that allows an investigation of Kunz's proposition about refugee vintages. It also enables research on whether the motivations for refugee migration have altered over time. Since, fourthly, the migration from Afghanistan has occurred to neighboring countries, it generally consists of relatively straight-forward and single-step transfers with fewer intervening obstacles.

Pakistan was chosen in preference to Iran because it has the greater number of Afghan refugees. Furthermore, considerably more refugee research has been conducted in Pakistan, which provided a relatively stable base from which to conduct the present study and facilitated the use of comparative materials. The establishment, by the Government of Pakistan, of the office of the Chief Commissioner for Afghan Refugees (CCAR) to oversee the settlement of refugees suggested that country-wide data might be available on the research population. The most popular destination for Afghan refugees is the North West Frontier Province, or NWFP, in which approximately seventy percent have sought asylum, and this was selected as the focus of the study.

Any investigation of the migration of refugees out of Afghanistan must commence with a summary of the events which led to this mass exodus. A review of the evolution of the crisis that has stricken Afghanistan is contained in Chapter 2, together with an assessment of the impact this war has had on the population of that country. The initial research objectives and design, together with subsequent changes that were forced upon the project, are detailed in Chapter 3, together with some characteristics of the target population and refugee villages. In Chapter 4, the flight and resettlement of Afghan refugees is examined according to the Kunz terminology and the theoretical components of the model are discussed, after which some conclusions on the predictive hypotheses of the theory are made. Finally, Chapter 5 will discuss the utility of the Kunz model as an explanation for involuntary movement, outlining the strengths and weaknesses of such an approach, and detail other possible applications for this particular theory.

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2

IMPACT OF WAR ON THE POPULATION OF AFGHANISTAN

THE EVOLUTION OF THE CRISIS

The current crisis in Afghanistan erupted on the morning of April 27, 1978, when the government of President Mohammed Daoud was overthrown in a *coup d'etat* by revolutionary Marxist military officers. Although the *Saur* Revolution, named after the time of the year in the Afghan calendar, was conducted between units of the armed forces, it was not a military takeover, for the leadership clearly was comprised of civilian leaders of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Three members of the PDPA emerged from the *coup* as dominant figures of the new regime. Nur Mohammad Taraki, the elder statesman of the PDPA, was elected president and prime minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, while the deputy prime ministership was held jointly by Hafizullah Amin, a leading member of the *Khalq*[4] faction also responsible for the portfolio of minister for foreign affairs, and Barbak Karmal, the leader of the Parcham faction and vice president of the PDPA.

The PDPA quickly introduced a reform program designed to initiate a rapid social, political, and economic transformation of Afghan society along Marxist lines. The goal was to benefit the poorest people and bring about popular support for the government. In Hyman's (1982:79) opinion, these radical reformers rejected traditional customs and practices, branding them "medieval" and "backward", and introduced hastily prepared schemes that had been drawn up a decade earlier and were based upon idealist PDPA manifestos. The nucleus of the program consisted of four decrees: two agrarian reforms aimed at the simultaneous abolition of land mortgages and rural indebtedness and the introduction of a radical scheme for land redistribution; and two social reforms directed towards changes in marriage regulations and programs of compulsory literacy. For numerous reasons, the reform program failed to attract widespread support.

The rural population, which traditionally had resented the intrusion of central governments into provincial affairs, rejected these new initiatives. In general, the agrarian changes threatened to alter the

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[4] The PDPA was a coalition of two factions: the *Khalqs* (masses) and the *Parchams* (banner).

socioeconomic framework of rural society without providing viable replacements, while the social reforms eroded traditional cultural values and social relations. According to Halliday (1980:20-41, cited in Gupta, 1986:67-8), the greatest complications lay in the social fabric, since social relations in rural Afghanistan are not perceived in class terms but rather along tribal, ethnic, and religious lines. In contrast, the government reforms focussed on the class interests of the poor and landless peasants. In addition, many of these reforms were related to land, and thus angered the rural tribes because, Hyman (1982:94) argues, the redistribution of land and the abolition of rural debts disrupted the traditional system of credit, leaving many peasants on the verge of subsistence. Confiscation of land also offended the Afghan sense of justice, failed to mobilize the rural poor for the Marxist state, and contributed to the chaotic conditions of civil war which overtook Afghanistan in the summer of 1979. The political traditions of Afghanistan also were ignored. Halliday (1980:20-41, cited in Gupta, 1986:67-8) argues that political and social issues, such as conflict within the state or between the state and its subjects, historically have been settled by the gun rather than by peaceful compromise.

The revolutionary rhetoric of the programs was another inhibiting factor. The Marxist-Leninist oratory of government programs was totally alien to the Afghan villager, who was only accustomed to the eloquence of Islam. Most Afghans viewed the new regime as anti-Islamic and their actions to be a tool of foreign "infidels" (Isby, 1989:19). In fact, President Taraki's hostility to Islam was the catalyst in creating a nationwide resistance to the new administration.

The new regime further alienated the population by making extensive purges within the existing administration, while mass dismissals of bureaucrats and technocrats left government operating below the minimum level of administrative efficiency. Gupta (1986:48) argues that these purges ravaged the administrative structure of government until it was without the necessary personnel to implement the desired reforms. In short, the new regime had attempted to change conditions too quickly, especially considering that Afghanistan "... was a country long accustomed to traditional torpor and inertia ... [and that] a more gradualist, incremental approach might have given better results" (Gupta, 1986:48). Another fundamental weakness was the absence of an organizational base beyond the main towns and cities. Support for the revolution was almost entirely urban based, with very little endorsement drawn from the rural areas.

The heavy-handed tactics adopted by the government to impose new policies were "... composed in equal parts of brutality, stupidity and ineptitude, [as] the *Khalq* regime set about turning Afghanistan into a Brummagen Stalinist Russia" (Isby, 1989:18). Excessive force was used by squads of soldiers and *Khalq* militants to enforce reforms in rural areas. Hyman (1982:96) notes that these acts included the desecration of religious books, the pillage of houses, violent assaults on peasants, landowners and mullahs, and the indiscriminate murder of local notables

and peasants considered to be against the revolution. He argues that the government intended to use this show of force to upset the old order, break traditional ties, and encourage landless peasants to adopt a proper revolutionary spirit. In fact, the misplaced zeal of the revolutionaries only managed to unite rural communities against the government (Hyman, 1982:96).

Open resistance commenced the day the Marxists seized control in Kabul. During the summer of 1978, further revolt erupted in the provinces of Kunar and Badakhshan (Figure 2.1) and spread to others. By the beginning of 1979, there was armed resistance in twenty-five of Afghanistan's twenty-nine provinces. Antigovernment sentiments had linked together the traditionalists, the supporters of old, village Afghanistan, with the Islamist opposition in a war of faith, or *jehad*, against the communists. By the fall of 1979, the situation in Afghanistan had deteriorated considerably. Not only had the government's repressive policies failed to achieve their goals but also they had reinforced popular resistance which had spread throughout the country. Government reacted to such opposition with increased repression, especially through the secret police and military police. The population of Kabul became increasingly fearful of being detained by security forces and imprisoned in one of the country's notorious prisons. During the first twenty months of Marxist rule, between 50,000 and 100,000 people are said to have disappeared in Afghan prisons (Dupree and Dupree, 1987:17).

FIGURE 2.1

PROVINCES OF AFGHANISTAN



As factional fighting erupted, the PDPA coalition between the *Khalq* and *Parcham* parties dissolved. The postcoup power struggle saw the *Khalq* party take control, with the *Parcham* members either eliminated or expelled from government, with leading officials, such as future presidents Karmal and Najibullah, exiled to Moscow. However, the power struggle within the PDPA continued, culminating on September 14, 1979, with President Taraki being overthrown by then Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin and subsequently murdered. As insurgency spread throughout the country, Amin requested additional military support from the Soviet government. Several thousand Soviet military advisors were sent to direct military operations for the Afghan government. The Soviets kept an anxious watch on the range and scale of fighting in the Afghan civil war and began preparing alternative plans to save the Marxist revolution.

On December 27, 1979, a force of 85,000 Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan and defeated those loyal to Amin, who was killed in the fighting. A few days later, the more moderate and Moscow-aligned Babrak Karmal was installed as president after returning from exile in Moscow. However this invasion, Saikal (1989:176) argues, failed to achieve its principal objective of stamping out bloody factionalism within the PDPA and consolidating the party's rule. Very quickly, the role of the Soviet forces changed from the defence of Kabul and major military installations to direct combat with the rebels, because of an increasing decline in moral throughout the Afghan Army, compounded by defections, purges, and casualties. The Afghan Army experienced great difficulty in maintaining its military personnel. Military service was compulsory for all men up to the age of thirty-five years and length of conscription had to be extended to three years. Army and police "press gangs" raided residential areas in Kabul to search for male conscripts (Wakman, 1985:91-2).

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought with it a significant change in the nature of the war. Maley and Saikal (1986:4) have commented on the increase in sophistication of weapons used against the local population. Fighting expanded into regions not previously involved and the Soviets initiated extensive assaults by routinely bombing strategic areas with bombs, rockets, incendiary and chemical weapons from MIG jets, helicopter gunships, and artillery. The Soviets adopted a "scorched earth" policy and their systematic attacks destroyed the agricultural infrastructure of the country, as crops and trees were burned, and fields, *kareez*[5], barns, and houses bombed. In addition, Soviet tactics included the widespread and random distribution of anti-personnel mines and booby-trapped bombs throughout the Afghan countryside. As a result of these campaigns of terror, vast tracts of rural Afghanistan were depopulated (Isby, 1989:20).

[5] *Kareez* - the traditional Afghan irrigation system of underground channels.

Instead of eliminating the *mujahideen*[6] resistance and extending the influence of the PDPA, Soviet actions merely increased the outrage of the Afghan people, who justified in terms of Islam their fight against the non-believing foreigners from the north. Most analysts, such as Dupree and Dupree (1987:17), agree that 1987 was the turning point in the war, with the introduction of American Stinger and British Blowpipe ground-to-air missiles. The cost of the war for the Soviets began to escalate as their aerial supremacy diminished, with nearly one plane a day being shot down by the mujahideen.

As the war protracted Soviet casualties steadily increased, with more than 15,000 Soviets killed and 37,000 wounded in ten years (1979-1989). The growing human cost of intervention in Afghanistan was increasingly unpopular with the Soviet public, and led Gorbachev to describe it as a "bleeding wound" (Saikal, 1989:177). The Soviets realized that their military investment had not managed to extend the narrow base of PDPA support beyond the major urban areas, whereas the *mujahideen's* sphere of influence encompassed more than three-quarters of the country. The Soviets saw little hope of maintaining the puppet regime in Kabul with any trace of "legitimacy, vitality, or, most importantly, survivability" (Daley, 1989:497). To add to these problems, divisions within the PDPA increased after May 1986 when Najibullah, head of the Afghan secret police (KHAD), was installed in power.

Gorbachev sought to reduce Soviet losses and find an "honorable" exit for the Soviets out of Afghanistan since, as Saikal (1989:177) argues, that involvement conflicted with his new policies of *glasnost*, *perestroika*, and *demokratizatsiia*. Diplomatic discussions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, endorsed by USSR and USA, had been in progress since 1982, but Soviet initiatives hastened these peace talks which, within a matter of days, culminated on April 14, 1988, with the signing of the Geneva Accords. These consisted of four instruments and a memorandum. The first instrument was a bilateral agreement of noninterference and nonintervention between Afghanistan and Pakistan and the second, also between Afghanistan and Pakistan, guaranteed the safe and voluntary return of all refugees in Pakistan. The third instrument was a commitment by the Soviet Union to withdraw half of its troops within four months and all troops within ten. Finally, the Accords included a Declaration of International Guarantees, in which the USSR and the USA pledged to refrain from interference and intervention in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and Pakistan (Cronin, 1989:208).

As scheduled, the Soviets began a sequence of staggered troop withdrawals on May 15, 1988. About half its forces, 50,000 men, had been withdrawn by August 15 and the total 103,000 armed personnel had left Afghanistan by February 15, 1989 (Cronin, 1989:212).

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6 *Mujahideen* are the armed Afghan resistance fighters, estimated to number between 150,000 and 300,000 men.

The Afghan resistance parties were not parties to the talks or the agreement and consequently never ratified the Accords. According to *Hezb-i-Islami* leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a solution to the Afghanistan problem could be achieved only through direct dialogue between the Soviet Union and the *mujahideen* (Siddiqi, 1989:130), while the resistance in general argued that the United States and Pakistan were "peripheral if not irrelevant" observers and that the Kabul government was nothing but a Soviet "puppet" (Thomas, 1989:18). Even with the withdrawal of Soviet forces, the PDPA government managed to cling to power, albeit with Soviet assistance. President Najibullah had endeavored to unite the PDPA with the expulsion of key party rivals, such as forcibly dispatching to Moscow the powerful *Khalqi* Interior Minister, Sayyed Mohammed Gulabzoi. This did not dampen the factional-fighting between the *Khalq* and *Parcham* groups of the PDPA, and Najibullah's strategy of national reconciliation disintegrated.

Soviet withdrawal involved no commitment to suspend the amount and quality of military assistance. In the following six months, the Soviets sent more than US$1.5 billion of military arms to the Republic of Afghanistan, including some of their most sophisticated weapons like MIG-27 fighters and medium-range SS-1 (SCUD) guided missiles. This is the reason for Saikal's (1989:179) suggestion that after the Soviet withdrawal, fighting in Afghanistan continued at perhaps even greater intensity, yet the Kabul regime was unable to extend its sphere of influence beyond the urban areas. At the same time, the *mujahideen* forces could not coordinate the large and united offensives necessary to dislodge the communists from power and win the war. The coalition of seven political parties to form the Afghan Interim Government (AIG) in Peshawar has not aided the political leadership of the resistance, since opposition from external groups has added to the internal dissension from different groups within the alliance, such as the subsequent withdrawal of Hekmatyar's *Hezb-i-Islami* faction from the union. The AIG has refused to negotiate a peaceful solution to the crisis with the PDPA, so that the turmoil and tragedy in Afghanistan continues.

THE DECIMATION OF THE AFGHAN POPULATION


Thirteen years of conflict have had a devastating impact on the population of Afghanistan (Figure 2.2), which in the 1979 Afghanistan census was estimated at thirteen million. Sliwinski (1989a:39) has calculated that, between 1978 and the end of 1987, approximately 1,240,000 persons or nine percent of the prewar Afghan population, were killed in the war. In addition, approximately six million people had been forced to abandon Afghanistan and seek asylum in the neighboring countries of Iran (two million) and Pakistan (four million), while an additional two million had been displaced within the country. Given that most warfare occurred beyond the cities, there was a tremendous impact on the rural population, which was reduced from eighty-five percent of the national total in 1978 to twenty-three percent by 1987 (Figure 2.2).

People living in various parts of the country were affected by war in different ways, but unfortunately data are available for only eighty percent of the country. Sliwinski (1989a:47) documents that the heaviest war casualties were sustained in the northern provinces bordering the Soviet Union (Figure 2.3). The average proportion of war deaths to the 1979 population in these nine provinces was 12.7 percent (127 deaths/1000 population), with Kunduz (15.1%), Samangan (14.1%), Faryab (13.5%), Baghlan (11.5%), Jowzjan (10.8%), and Balkh (9.8%) all sustaining high numbers of war deaths and far greater than the Afghanistan average of nine percent (Table 2.1).

Sliwinski (1989a:47) argued that high levels of war-related mortality in the north partly reflected the limited capacity of the resistance forces to defend a population situated far away from their sources of supply. In contrast, the Soviet supply lines flowed through this region, which meant that its main routes were heavily defended, while the topography, being basically steppe, offered little natural protection from aerial attack. The considerable distance of these provinces from the western border may have deterred many from seeking safety in Pakistan, whereas those who decided to flee would have been subjected to the twin impediments of attack from Kabul government forces and the extremely difficult physical conditions.

FIGURE 2.2

STRUCTURAL CHANGES TO THE POPULATION OF AFGHANISTAN: 1978-1987



Source: Sliwinski, 1989a:39

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UNDERSTANDING INVOLUNTARY POPULATION MOVEMENT

Involuntary migration impelled by disaster is not a new phenomenon. Large scale flows forced by the outbreak of conflicts between ethnic, religious, and national groups, or from the impact of natural disasters, have been evident throughout recorded history. However, the world has never witnessed as many refugees[1] and displaced persons[2] as there are today. The United States Committee on Refugees (1990:31) has reported that there were 15,093,900 refugees worldwide who required international protection and/or assistance at the end of 1989. They were waiting for asylum, resettlement, or repatriation in 102 different countries. At the same time it was estimated that between 13,547,000 and 18,317,000 persons had been displaced in just twenty-two of these countries (USCR, 1990:32). So far this century, approximately 140 million people are thought to have migrated involuntarily, leading to this era being labelled as "The Century of the Refugee: (Harrell-Bond, 1988:1).

Until recently, forced movements were more often associated with flight from the ravages of war-torn or socialist Europe, to other European countries, or to the major immigration countries of Australia, Canada, Israel, and the United States. However, Rogge (1987:7) has reminded us that significant involuntary migrations have occurred in the Third World throughout the twentieth century, as followed the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947 and the Palestinian crisis in 1948 after the creation of Israel.

It was not until a global explosion in the "size, intricacy and intractability" of refugee crises towards the end of the 1970s that attention was focussed on the Third World (Smyser, 1987: vii). Since

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[1] The definition of a refugee under the 1951 United Nations Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees is a person who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country."

[2] A displaced person is defined as a person who has been forced to move within his/her own country. Such a person does not come under the protection of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

TABLE 2.1

WAR DEATHS IN AFGHANISTAN, 1978-1987, AS A PERCENT OF 1979 POPULATION, BY PROVINCE AND REGION

Province	1979 Population	War Deaths (%)
PAKISTANI BORDER REGION		
Ghazni	646,623	7.9
Helmand	517,645	8.3
Kunar	250,132	7.7
Nangarhar	745,986	4.8
Paktia	484,023	4.4
Paktika	245,229	5.4
Kandahar	574,954	7.4
Zabul	179,362	3.2
Total	3,643,954	
IRAN BORDER REGION		
Farah	308,907	6.9
Herat	676,422	n.a.
Nimroz	122,036	n.a.
Total	1,107,365	
KABUL REGION		
Kabul	1,373,572	10.6
Kapisa	345,775	15.8
Laghman	310,751	3.9
Logar	216,303	9.1
Parwan	409,510	6.1
Wardak	287,605	3.9
Total	2,943,516	
AFGHANISTAN		
	13,051,357	**9.0**

Province	1979 Population	War Deaths (%)
USSR BORDER REGION		
Badakshan	497,758	n.a.
Badghis	233,613	n.a.
Baghlan	493,882	11.5
Balkh	569,255	9.8
Faryab	308,907	13.5
Jowzjan	588,609	10.8
Kunduz	555,437	15.1
Samangan	272,584	14.1
Takhar	519,752	n.a.
Total	4,039,797	
CENTRAL REGION		
Bamian	268,517	n.a.
Ghor	337,992	n.a.
Urozgan	436,418	4.3
Total	1,042,927	


NOTE: na denotes data not available

Source: Sliwinski, 1989a:48

The second region of high mortality related to the Afghanistan conflict is in vicinity of Kabul, particularly the provinces of Kapisa, Kabul and Logar (Figure 2.3). The highest recorded incidence of war deaths was in Kapisa province (15.8 percent of the total) which represents, based on the 1979 population, 54,632 deaths occurring between 1978 and 1987 (Table 2.1). Other provinces in the Kabul region suffering high death rates included Kabul (10.6%) and Logar (9.1%) and all three (including Kapisa) experienced mortality levels higher than the national average. The Soviet policy of deliberate depopulation would have focussed on these provinces, in an attempt to keep areas close to the national capital free of *mujahadeen* and their rural supporters. Those provinces that bordered the neighboring countries of Iran and Pakistan experienced levels of war-related deaths that were far lower than the national average. The argument that this reflects lower levels of military activity in fact was not the case, since border provinces endured many offensives launched by both the Afghan and Soviet armies. More likely, the relative ease with which residents were able to uproot quickly and flee to safety in either Iran or Pakistan was a major factor in the comparatively low levels of mortality in these border provinces.

FIGURE 2.3

WAR DEATHS IN AFGHANISTAN, AS A PERCENT OF LOCAL POPULATION IN 1979, BY PROVINCE: 1978-1987



Source: Sliwinski, 1989a

Sliwinski (1989a:43) has also analyzed the age-distribution of war-related deaths for the years between 1978 and 1987 (Table 2.2). Death rates for young male and female children (0-10 years) are similar, but increase noticeably for males in the older age groups. Overall, Afghan males suffered more than three times the rate of war-related deaths than did females; 134 deaths per thousand compared to 38 per thousand. Within the 11-20 age group male deaths, at 59 deaths per thousand as against 36/1000 for females, reflect marked differences in their lifestyles. On reaching puberty, the young Afghan girl is expected to follow the principle of *purdah*, the physical and symbolic isolation of the Islamic woman from the outside world, which includes greater confinement inside the compound and screening off by a veil or all-covering garment (*bourqa*) (Boesen, 1988:223). Since Afghan females marry very young, members of this cohort often would be confined to the inner sanctum with responsibilities of motherhood. In contrast, most Afghan males of the same age already have commenced work and many also would have begun fighting in the *jehad*.

In the next two age groups (21-30, 31-40) war-related deaths for females decreased, perhaps as further reflection of increasing responsibilities in the home, whereas male mortality increased significantly to 173/1000 (21-30 years) and peaked at 224 (31-40 years). Although male death rates decline slightly from the age of forty-one, they remain at levels considerably higher than for comparable females (Table 2.2). These patterns doubtless reflect the differential participation of men and women in the war. Sliwinski (1989a:42) notes that female rates increase noticeably after the age of forty, reaching 68/1000 for the 41-50 age group, when women's obligations in the extended family become less important and when more time is spent outside.

TABLE 2.2

WAR-RELATED DEATH RATES OF THE AFGHAN POPULATION, 1978-1987, BY AGE AT DEATH AND SEX

Age Group (years)	Males	Females	Both Sexes
	(deaths	per	thousand)
0-10	31	28	30
11-20	59	36	48
21-30	173	33	115
31-40	224	21	140
41-50	220	68	147
51-60	207	46	126
Over 60	173	70	130
All ages	134	38	90

Note: Based on 1979 Afghan population

Source: Sliwinski, 1989a:43

Another interesting effect of refugee migration to Pakistan has been a significant alteration in the ethnic composition of those remaining in Afghanistan (Sliwinski, 1989a:46). Previously, the Pushtuns were the most dominate ethnic group and also the most numerous amongst refugees in Pakistan. As a result of the exodus, the Pushtun population has been reduced from thirty-nine percent of the total in 1979 to twenty-two percent in 1987 at the same time that the proportion of Tajik has increased from twenty-six percent to thirty-four percent (Table 2.3). Small proportional increases have also been recorded for the Hazara and Uzbeck.

EXTENT OF THE AFGHAN EXODUS

The extent of the population exodus is the most outstanding feature of the Afghan conflict. Although impossible to gauge exactly, the United States Committee for Refugees (1990:31) has estimated that, by the end of 1989, 5,934,500 refugees had fled Afghanistan and sought asylum in Iran, Pakistan, and India. Of these, an estimated 2,350,000 persons have fled to Iran, 3,579,000 to Pakistan, and 5,500 to India. In addition, more than two million people have been displaced internally within Afghanistan.

TABLE 2.3

ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF AFGHANISTAN POPULATION (1979 AND 1987) AND AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN (1987).

Ethnic Group	Afghanistan 1979 (%)	Afghanistan 1987 (%)	Pakistan 1987 (%)
Pushtun	39	22	85
Tajiks	26	34	6
Hazaras	10	14	*
Uzbecks	10	14	*
Turkmen	3	4	1
Others	12	12	8

* Ethnic representation is less than 1 percent of total Afghan refugee population.

Source: Sliwinski, 1989a:46

It is impossible to obtain precise figures on the number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Published and unpublished totals can only be described as "intelligent estimates", the main reason for which Jones (1985:2) argues is that the refugee population is so large, extremely

mobile, dispersed over large tracts of land, and often located in inaccessible areas. Although located mainly in refugee villages, these stretch practically the entire length of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, a distance of 1,500 miles. In addition, Afghan refugees enter Pakistan through neither specific nor well-defined routes, but cross the border through one of hundreds of mountain passes. Once across, refugees generally travel to areas where people belonging to their own clan live where, after proper verification, they become registered. Other refugees, who are more wealthy and consequently not dependent on assistance, often do not register, thus adding to the difficulties of carrying out an accurate head count.

Official refugee figures in Pakistan are calculated by the Chief Commissioner for Afghan Refugees (CCAR) for the Government of Pakistan. Five major problems have been recognized with these data. First, they include only those refugees registered with the Commissionerate and living in one of numerous refugee camps. On the other hand, significant numbers of Afghan refugees reside in the urban areas of Pakistan, particularly Peshawar but also Quetta, Karachi, Islamabad, and Rawalpindi (Girardet, 1986a:10), who have blended into the urban scene but remain unregistered. A second group of unregistered refugees live in official camps but, having failed to register, do not exist officially and do not receive any material assistance. Despite the impossibility of ascertaining precisely the numbers of unregistered refugees, Boesen (1988:226) has estimated that about 600,000 live in Pakistan. In Dupree's (1988:848) judgement, between 130,000 and 200,000 unregistered refugees are found in the cities, with a further 150,000 awaiting registration.

A second problem is the accounting system used by the Chief Commissioner for Afghan Refugees, which very likely means that the registered population of refugee camps is seriously underrecorded. In many refugee villages, the birth of a child is not added into a register, although deaths tend to be subtracted. This means that recorded camp populations do not reflect natural increase, but only transfers of refugees or new registrations, which are few. The high fertility of Afghan women, still to be discussed, probably means that actual village populations are higher than recorded ones.

Thirdly, the CCAR has imposed a maximum limit of seven persons a family eligible for registration, irrespective of its actual size. Although CCAR data report an average of 6.2 persons per family, high fertility could result in average family size being much greater than seven.


Although these first three problems result in the Afghan refugee population being under reported, the other two would have an inflationary effect on estimates. One involves the incidence of "ghost" families, or those who left the camps without cancelling their registration. Some allegations, unable to be substantiated, are that camp officials exaggerated registered numbers to obtain additional ration allocations, which were then sold. The other is that some refugees hold more than one registration passbook, in one or more camps, and

consequently receive double allocations of aid. However, these problems of under and over estimation do not cancel each other out and the refugee population in Pakistan has been seriously under recorded.

Almost 2.4 million refugees fled to Pakistan in the first four years of the conflict in Afghanistan and by mid 1982, the Government of Pakistan reported 2.9 million refugees had arrived (Figure 2.4). However, in 1983 registration was frozen by the government to enable the recounting of refugees. On completion, in 1984, the number of registered refugees was announced officially to have been reduced to 2.4 million. Since then, a steady stream of arrivals continued to appear and, by October 1990, the number of Afghan refugees registered with the Government of Pakistan had swollen to more than 3.2 million.

FIGURE 2.4

AFGHAN REFUGEE REGISTRATION IN PAKISTAN, 1978-1990



Source: G.O.P., 1990

Despite this steady exodus from Afghanistan since 1978, Rizvi (1988:41) has noted a correlation between the influx into Pakistan and the amount of fighting within Afghanistan, so that whenever conflict intensified, the number taking flight increased. The arrival of refugees

began soon after the *Saur* coup in 1978, when approximately 109,000 Afghans sought asylum during that year. Soon after the overthrow of Taraki by Amin in September 1979, these numbers almost doubled to 193,000, but dramatic displacement occurred following the Soviet invasion and, within days, numbers had increased to a staggering 400,000. During 1980-81, the flood of refugees peaked at 80,000 to 90,000 a month, an average of about 3,000 people per day (Azhar, 1985:61). The Commissioner for Afghan Refugees (NWFP), reported a five-fold increase of 20,000 refugees during a two-month period (August-September 1985), which reflected Soviet summer offensives (Dupree, 1988:849), while a further influx corresponded to intense fighting in the Jalalabad region, following the Soviet withdrawal in February 1989. Rashid (1989:26) estimates that 70,000 refugees fled during a three month period.

In general, this flow of refugees into Pakistan partly reflects the success between 1980 and 1988 of the Soviet depopulation strategy, which affected different provinces to varying degrees (Figure 2.5). Sliwinski (1989a:47) argues that this strategy was "a conscious, ordered, and planned Soviet policy" and was an attempt to isolate *mujahideen* movements through the creation of a "*cordon sanitaire*" along the Pakistan border. Between 1979 and 1981, the Soviets deployed a campaign of extensive aerial bombardment to force the population to flee the Pakistan border region (Figure 2.6). The depopulation policy was then directed between 1982 and 1984, toward the central provinces surrounding the capital, and, finally, around 1986, concentrated on the Soviet border provinces (Sliwinski, 1989a:50). The success of this strategy is reflected in the provincial clustering for years of maximum *hejrat* (flight) to Pakistan.


In particular, three of the nine provinces of Afghanistan bordering Pakistan experienced the displacement of more than half their population through refugee movement (Table 2.4). The province of Paktia has lost almost nine-tenths its prewar population, while Kunar and Nangarhar provinces have lost sixty-nine and fifty-seven percent respectively (Figure 2.5). Three other border provinces, Helmand, Kandahar, and Paktika, each experienced the displacement of between thirty and forty-five percent of their prewar population, while Zabul lost slightly less than thirty percent.

Other regions which lost sizeable proportions of their provincial population were Logar, which borders both Paktia and Nangarhar, which lost more than eighty-one percent, and the two northern provinces of Kunduz and Baghlan, which both lost more than thirty percent. Moreover, the impact of such relocations within the country would be greater if these data included refugee movements into Iran.

If provinces that experienced high rates of departure (Figure 2.5) are compared to those of high rates of war-related mortality (Figure 2.3), a further feature becomes apparent. Of the nine provinces recording high death rates, defined as greater than ninety deaths per thousand, only Logar and Baghlan experienced high losses from displacement,

FIGURE 2.5


DEPOPULATION OF AFGHANISTAN DUE TO REFUGEE MIGRATION, AS A PERCENTAGE OF 1979 PROVINCIAL POPULATION, BY PROVINCE, 1978-1989



Source: Thomas, 1990:29

FIGURE 2.6

YEAR OF MAXIMUM REFUGEE EXODUS FROM AFGHANISTAN, BY PROVINCE, 1978-1987



Source of data: Sliwinski, 1989a:29

TABLE 2.4

ESTIMATED POPULATIONS OF SURVEYED REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN, 1988-89

	Surveyed Refugees (UNHCR)			
Province	Census Population	Number of Refugees 1978-79 Census	Percent of 1979 Surveyed by UNHCR 1988-89	Percent of Total Afghan Refugees in Pakistan
Badakhshan	497,758	258	0.05	0.01
Badghis	233,613	0	0.00	0.00
Baghlan	493,882	180,900	36.63	6.74
Bąlkh	569,255	33,486	5.88	1.25
Bamian	268,517	174	0.06	0.01
Farah	308,907	9,456	3.06	0.35
Faryab	582,705	5,502	0.94	0.21
Ghazni	646,623	42,588	6.59	1.59
Ghor	337,992	312	0.09	0.01
Helmand	517,645	174,096	33.63	6.49
Herat	676,422	588	0.09	0.02
Jowzjan	588,609	48,336	8.21	1.80
Kabul	1,373,572	204,462	14.89	7.62
Kandahar	574,954	239,088	41.58	8.91
Kapisa	345,775	8,178	2.37	0.31
Kunar	250,132	172,506	68.97	6.43
Kunduz	555,437	240,060	43.22	8.95
Laghman	310,751	66,678	21.46	2.48
Logar	216,303	176,382	81.54	6.57
Nangarhar	745,986	425,106	56.99	15.84
Nimroz	122,036	3,306	2.71	0.12
Paktia	484,023	433,159	89.49	16.14
Paktika	245,229	77,094	31.44	2.87
Parwan	409,510	31,338	7.65	1.17
Samangan	272,584	14,844	5.45	0.55
Takhar	519,752	14,910	2.87	0.56
Uruzgan	436,418	8,064	1.85	0.30
Wardak	287,605	23,178	8.06	0.86
Zabul	179,362	49,428	27.56	1.84
Total	**13,051,357**	**2,683,477**	**100.00**	

Source: UNHCR, 1990e:4

defined as greater than thirty-five percent of the 1979 population. Death rates are lower in border provinces with greater accessibility to places of safe asylum than in those situated some distance inland. This suggests that death rates were lower where migration was less difficult and higher in those provinces where it was not a viable option.

DISTRIBUTION OF AFGHAN REFUGEES WITHIN PAKISTAN

In October 1990, there were 3,273,079 registered refugees in Pakistan (GOP, 1990:1). Almost seven out of every ten have settled in North West Frontier Province (NWFP), about a quarter in Baluchistan and only five percent in Punjab (Table 2.5). Registered, and even unregistered refugees are found in 343 refugee tented villages (RTVs) that are widely distributed throughout North West Frontier and Baluchistan provinces, but in just two locations in Punjab province (Figure 2.7). Of the national total of RTVs, seventy-three percent (256) are located in NWFP, twenty-two percent (77) in Baluchistan province, and only five percent (16) in Punjab.

The largest number of refugees, 512,171 persons, have settled in the district of Peshawar, as a result of which it has been divided for administrative purposes into two subdistricts: Peshawar I and Peshawar II. In the former 286,633 refugees, 8.7 percent of the national total, reside in thirty-four refugee villages and seven percent of the country's total (228,655) live in thirty-two refugee villages in Peshawar II (Figure 2.7).

As capital of NWFP, Peshawar is a major attraction for refugees and its people have strong ethnic and linguistic links to Afghanistan. This lack of ethnic or linguistic barriers, compounded by the proximity of the border provinces of Afghanistan, has meant employment opportunities for new arrivals. It is only thirty-five miles to the city of Peshawar from the border, through the Khyber Pass, which for centuries has been a traditional gateway. The international aid community also has established itself in Peshawar in response to the numbers of refugees, which in turn has reinforced their concentration. Especially for the sick and injured, the medical facilities offered by voluntary organizations are an added attraction.

A second large concentration (347,852 refugees) is found in thirty-four RTVs in the tribal territory of Kurram agency, to the southwest of Peshawar (Figure 2.7). These settlements are concentrated along the road leading from Thal to Parachinar - which then proceeds through the Teri Mangal Pass into Afghanistan - or situated very close to the border itself. Three major passes, Lakka Tigga, Karlachi Pass and Teri Mangal Pass, lead from the province of Paktia into Kurram agency and all three have been major exits. However, Teri Mangal Pass has been the route taken by an especially large number fleeing from not only from Paktia, but also Logar, Wardak, and Kabul.

then, the overwhelming majority of involuntary population movements have originated in countries such as Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and El Salvador, and flowed to similar countries, increasingly placing the burdens of mass exodus on the poorest countries - those "barely able to cope with their own struggle for survival and manifestly ill-equipped to cope with the consequences of refugee crises" (Zetter, 1988:4).

With the rapid growth in refugee numbers, many countries of first asylum have found it increasingly difficult to provide durable solutions[3] to the crises, being particular concerned that they have been left with long-term refugee populations. As Adelman (1988:8) has commented, countries of first asylum resent the fact that countries of resettlement have accepted the elite of such populations and left behind "the aged, crippled, psychologically disturbed, ill and illiterate as a problem for local authorities - countries with the least economic capacity of handling them." Countries such as Hong Kong and Thailand have introduced policies of "humane deterrence" in an attempt to discourage further influxes. Others, like Malaysia, have adopted more forceful measures to deter the arrival of refugees, such as pushing refugee-laden boats back out to sea, so that they would have to seek asylum elsewhere.

As wave after wave of refugees has continued to take flight from their homelands, it has become apparent that such crises are neither temporary nor unique events. According to Stein (1981:320), this inaccurate perception of the provisional nature of refugee crises has led to an

> incompleteness, things left undone, a failure to evaluate programs, to prepare for the next wave of refugees, to experiment with alternative strategies, to develop coordination, to undertake research and to learn from the past.

He urged support for refugee research, so that strategies such as comprehensive systems of professional assistance might be developed (Stein, 1981:321). As Connor (1987a:12) has commented, at present the "lack of substantive research on the characteristics and behavior of refugees" has hindered the training of refugee specialists.

Despite the substantial work on population mobility produced by geographers, the topic of involuntary migration has received limited attention. Rogge (1977:186) discussing Southern Africa, has argued that there is "an apparent apathy among geographers towards the understanding of the nature, directions and implications of refugee migrations". Hart and Rogerson (1982:125) echo this position, noting that such "neglect is reflected in the meagre literature contributed by population geographers on refugee issues in recent years." In addition, Connor (1987a:12) has stated that "of the academic disciplines usually

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[3] Traditionally, there are only three durable solutions to the problem of refugees: repatriation to the country from which the refugees fled; settlement and integration in the country of first asylum; and resettlement in a country abroad.

TABLE 2.5


AFGHAN REFUGEE POPULATION IN PAKISTAN, AUGUST 1990

District or Agency	Number of Refugees	Percent of of Total Refugees	Number of Refugee Families
NORTH WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE			
Abbotabad	143,526	4.39	23,860
Bajaur	198,691	6.07	28,585
Bannu	72,604	2.22	10,469
Chitral	38,322	1.17	6,556
Dir	89,313	2.73	15,682
D.I. Khan	87,640	2.68	12,928
Kohat	232,437	7.10	32,265
Kurram	347,852	0.63	50,718
Malakand	55,283	1.69	7,955
Manshera	71,628	2.19	10,164
Mardan	106,812	3.26	18,000
Mohamad	15,555	0.48	2,593
North Waziristan	183,507	5.61	26,113
Orakazi	13,418	0.41	1,983
Peshawar I	286,633	8.76	58,503
Peshawar II	228,655	6.99	42,335
South Waziristan	57,884	1.77	9,170
Swat	13,994	0.43	2,526
Provincial Total	**3,243,754**	**68.56**	**360,405**
BALUCHISTAN			
Chagai	172,116	5.26	28,584
Chaman	40,749	1.24	5,955
Gulistan	182,968	5.59	28,045
Muslim Bagh	55,352	1.69	9,127
Pishin	166,994	5.10	25,298
Quetta	126,637	3.87	21,257
Zhob/Loralai	105,128	3.21	16,951
Provincial Total	**849,944**	**25.96**	**135,217**
PUNJAB			
Daratang	14,969	0.46	2,470
Kotchandna	164,412	5.02	29,243
Provincial Total	**179,381**	**5.48**	**31,713**
Total Pakistan	**3,273,079**	**100.00**	**527,335**

Source: GOP, 1989:2

FIGURE 2.7

DISTRIBUTION OF REFUGEE TENTED VILLAGES IN PAKISTAN, 1990



Source of data: G.O.P., 1990

Bajaur agency, north of Peshawar, has a sizable refugee population of 198,691 persons resident in twenty-five villages, all of them located near to the Nawa Pass and in close proximity to the border with Kunar province (Afghanistan). To the south of Peshawar, nineteen villages have been established between the towns of Kohat and Thal in the district of Kohat. Here, the CCAR has recorded 232,437 refugees, which make up 7.1% of the national total.

Despite this heavy obvious and heavy concentration in NWFP of refugee settlement close to the Afghan/Pakistan border, numerous others are found in the east of the province in camps in Abbottabad and Manshera districts. Those eighteen villages in the district of Abbottabad are mostly located near the town of Haripur (143,526 refugees), while another nine camps lie further north in the district of Manshera. Weather conditions in these eastern settlements are not as severe as those to the west and southwest, for temperatures are milder and far more rainfall is received from the monsoons.

The province of Baluchistan, another major destination for Afghan refugees, has its principal concentration in the area between the capital city of Quetta and the border with Afghanistan (Figure 2.7). As with Peshawar, this reflects strong tribal, cultural, and linguistic ties, since the Pushtuns and the Baluchis are the two major tribes and their respective languages are spoken both sides of the border. This area, just 144 miles from the city of Kandahar through the Khojak Pass to Quetta, has been a major destination and a principal route into southwestern Pakistan. The Quetta district has also been subdivided for administrative purposes.

Seven refugee villages (126,637 refugees) lie beyond the provincial capital of Quetta, while to the north are a further nineteen in the subdistrict of Pishin (Table 2.5). In fact, the adjoining subdistrict of Gulistan has the largest number, 182,968 refugees or 5.6 percent of the country's total found in twelve settlements. Yet another five are located at Chaman, just near the Khojak Pass into Afghanistan.

The second major concentration in Baluchistan province is the twenty-one villages around the town of Chagai, in the western region, located almost on the Afghan border. Since this district is one of the most isolated in Pakistan, probably it has been a destination for refugees fleeing from southwestern provinces of Afghanistan, like Helmand, Nimroz, and Farah.

Apart from these major concentrations in both NWFP and Baluchistan, sixteen RTVs in the Punjab province, at Mianwali, date from 1982 and reflect government responses to increasing pressure exerted on the limited resources of NWFP. Settlements were established for refugees relocated from other areas, which has resulted in them having a wide cross section of the Afghan population. The refugee population in the Punjab come from many different provinces, and number 179,381 persons, or 5.5 percent of the country's total.

While it is possible to describe the provinces of origin for the Afghan refugee population (Table 2.4, Figure 2.8), and their place of

destination in Pakistan (Table 2.4, Figure 2.7), it is extremely difficult to link these sets of information for an appreciation of migrant flows. The UNHCR has included some data in an appendix of the provincial profiles about its survey of refugee origins.

Only eleven such provincial reports have been published to date, accounting for about sixty-three percent of the refugee population, from a total of fourteen planned to encompass the origins of nine out of every ten arrivals. An additional difficulty is that the UNHCR has chosen to produce reports on Afghan provinces where smaller proportions of refugees originate, such as Ghazni (5.3%), Zabul (1.8%), Wardak (0.9%), and Herat, which is minor, rather than for principal provinces like Kunduz (9.0%), Kabul (7.6%), and Baghlan (6.7%).

Overall, the UNHCR presented survey information on the origins of 269,641 families, a little more than half those registered (525,860 families). Despite the limitations in this data, it is possible to discern origin-destination flows for ten provinces.

The UNHCR (1990f:3) found that overall, eighty-nine percent of the refugee population came from eleven provinces in Afghanistan (Figure 2.8), with the greatest numbers having fled from the eastern border provinces of Paktia (433,159 persons, or 16.1% of all refugees) and Nangarhar (425,106 persons or 15.8%: Table 2.4). Refugees originating from "inland" provinces surrounding the capital, especially Kabul, Logar and Laghman, further emphasize the extent of displacement from this eastern region (Figure 2.9). Furthermore, other provinces bordering Pakistan, particularly Kandahar, Helmand, and Kunar, and to a lesser extent Paktika and Zabul, have also been notable areas of refugee origins, from which more than a quarter of all refugees have fled. It is somewhat surprising to find that a large number of refugees have fled from northern provinces, particularly Kunduz and Baghlan, but also Jowzjan and Balkh, despite their considerable distance from Pakistan (Figure 2.9).


Although there is a wide distribution of refugees throughout NWFP and Baluchistan, most families have settled in districts close to their province of origin. More than fifty-five percent of refugees from the six provinces bordering Pakistan, were found in districts abutting their home province, with many of the remainder also living nearby (UNHCR, 1990a-f).

The large number of refugees displaced from Paktia are also the most widely distributed throughout Pakistan, being found in eighteen of the twenty-seven districts and subdistricts surveyed by UNHCR (Figure 2.10). However, many have congregated in adjoining Pakistani districts, particularly Kurram and Peshawar.

The displacement of refugees from Kunar has also been very focused, with fifty-four percent settling in Bajaur district alone, and a further sixteen percent in Dir and five percent in Chitral, which all border Kunar. These refugees, as well as those from Laghman, have settled almost exclusively in the northern areas of NWFP, apart from a few found in Mianwali.

FIGURE 2.8


ORIGIN OF NINETY PERCENT OF AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN, BY PROVINCE, 1990



Source: UNHCR, 1990e:12

FIGURE 2.9


REFUGEE EXODUS FROM AFGHANISTAN TO PAKISTAN, BY PROVINCE OF ORIGIN, 1978-1989



Source of data: UNHCR, 1989 a-h, 1990 a-c

FIGURE 2.10

PATTERNS OF REFUGEE MIGRATIONS FROM AFGHANISTAN TO PAKISTAN, BY PROVINCE, 1978-1989



The settlement pattern for families from the inland provinces of Logar, Wardak, and Ghazni, is more dispersed than most of the border provinces, with refugees living in sixteen, fifteen and twelve Pakistani districts respectively, albeit in smaller numbers. It is possible that greater obstacles to flight forced these refugees to use more escape routes, which in turn caused them to arrive at many destinations. In contrast, refugees from Kandahar and Zabul have settled in the fewest districts, with almost all families found in adjacent Baluchistan province. There is an overwhelming concentration (ninety-seven percent) of Kandahar refugees in the four Quetta subdistricts, which reflects the strong connections between Afghanistan and Pakistan in this region, especially through the Khojak Pass.

From the analysis of UNHCR data and other limited data, it is clear that refugee migration has been a significant option to the people of war-torn Afghanistan. In general, as the distance between battle front and potential places of asylum increases, so the incidence of flight diminishes. An overwhelming majority have relocated to districts of Pakistan that are adjacent to or nearby their home province. Numerous examples of dramatic increases in refugee arrivals corresponding to upsurges in the intensity of internal conflict suggest a strong link between the incidence of fighting in Afghanistan and of refugee exodus.

While an aggregate view of refugee movements between Afghanistan and Pakistan has documented some interesting patterns, further details are needed to understand the processes involved. To establish what kinds of people have been affected by this crisis and to understand why they left their homes, relocated to Pakistan, and chose to live in refugee villages, often in unfamiliar environments, requires a much more detailed level of investigation - microlevel case studies of particular villages, families and individuals. The following chapter details the methodology adopted in this investigation and why it was selected, together with a description of the study area and refugee tented villages, with a demographic profile of the refugee population.

3

REFUGEE VILLAGES AND FIELD ENQUIRIES

THE NORTH WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

The North West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan is steeped in history, dating back to the creation of the Kingdom of Gandhara in the 6th Century B.C. However, the area is probably best remembered as the north-western extremity of British India, from which the province obtained its name. The British extended their realm of authority over most of this region from 1849 until Pakistan obtained independence in 1947 - an influence that is still evident today.

In 1893 the British formally established a border, known as the Durand Line, to separate British India from Afghanistan. A major consequence was that this boundary divided the lands of the Pushtun people, also known as Pukhtuns or Pathans, one of the world's largest tribal societies. Before the outbreak of hostilities in Afghanistan in 1978, approximately half of the estimated twelve million Pushtun people were located in Afghanistan and half in Pakistan (Wirsing, 1981). The Pushtuns are divided into a number of tribal groups based on the ties of common descent, including the Durrani, Ghilzai, Kakar, Wazir, Khatak, Shinwari, Afridi, Yusufzai, Mohmand and Orakzai. Although the majority of Pushtuns were settled farmers, the tribal group also included almost all the nomads (*kuchis* of Afghanistan or *powindahs* of Pakistan) (Janata, 1980:2-3; Dupree, 1973:57-64).

The establishment of this border did not deter movement between Afghanistan and Pakistan. One significant group were the estimated 60,000 nomadic *kuchis* who annually circulated between summer pastures in Afghanistan and winter pastures in Pakistan (Male, 1987:39). More recently, modern nomadic traders have also smuggled western consumer goods to the markets of Pakistan, particularly the city of Peshawar, while other merchants and businessmen have conducted legal trade in towns and cities on both sides of the border (Male, 1987:39). In recent years, the old caravan routes have also been used by drug smugglers to traffic opium, heroin, and hashish from the "Golden Crescent" area of Afghanistan and Pakistan to the cities of Pakistan and on to developed nations.

The Pushtun tribesman's passion for freedom and independence, and his fierce reputation for the defence of his territory and honor, is legendary. This was well documented during the one hundred years of fighting between the Pathans and the soldiers of the British Raj by

authors such as Kipling (1892), Churchill (1930) and Singer (1984). The British were never able completely to subdue the Pushtuns. Consequently their lands, known as Tribal Agencies, were left as a buffer zone between Afghanistan and British India, where the tribes governed themselves according to their own laws - the *Pushtunwali*, an inflexible tribal law by which all true Pushtuns abide. This tradition of self-government in the tribal lands was adopted by the Pakistani government after independence in 1947, although political agents were introduced to supervise affairs.

The capital of NWFP is the city of Peshawar, recently described by Shaw (1989:283) as a "frontier town and quite unlike any other city in Pakistan" (Shaw, 1989:283). She found that although there were many modern features within the city, such as first-class hotels, international banks and a recognized university, in other parts like the old bazaar, little had changed in the past 100 years. Tribesmen, with rifles slung over their shoulders, are still seen walking through the streets, although today their weapons are modern AK47s and machine pistols.

Peshawar, as the major destination for refugees since the conflict in Afghanistan commenced, was the obvious choice as the base from which to conduct research. The large influx of refugees to the city prompted the NWFP government to provide assistance and establish camps on the outskirts of the city, tasks that were assumed in 1980 by the federal government. In addition, many thousands of displaced Afghans chose not to settle in these refugee villages, but have preferred to live within the city itself. Girardet (1986b:16) described Peshawar as a "mini-Kabul", because between a quarter and a third of the city's 1.2 million population were Afghans.

Most refugees have been Pushtuns who, without the inhibitions of cultural differences, have been able to integrate themselves into the lifestyle of Peshawar. Both refugees and hosts are members of the same tribe, Pushtun, and observe the same cultural system, *Pushtunwali*. They speak the same language, Pushtu, and observe the same religion, Islam. In addition, Pakistan has accepted the Afghans in accordance with one of the principles of Islamic law (*Sharia*) which declares that any person, Muslim or non-Muslim, who is fleeing persecution must be granted asylum and protection.

The streets of Peshawar reflect the integration of refugees into the business sector. Throughout the main shopping areas of Saddar Bazaar and the old city, Afghan handicraft shops sell traditional carpets, embroidery, jewelry, and clothes, as well as Russian souvenirs taken during the war. Many of the numerous buses brought from Afghanistan, which still bear the names of the cities they used to travel between, now link outlying refugee villages with the city.

A large number of international and non-government aid agencies have become established in Peshawar in response to the Afghan refugee crisis. These organizations vary from large international bodies, such as the UNHCR, the World Food Programme, and the International Red Cross, to numerous small non-government organizations. They provide a

multitude of services to the refugee community, particularly health and education programs, and also have commenced some rural reconstruction projects within Afghanistan. Most of the agencies are located in a suburb known as University Town, which in turn has attracted large numbers of Afghan refugees to the area, either as workers or trainees, or to receive medical or other forms of assistance. These activities have also attracted a large expatriate community, who live and work in the area.

The city of Peshawar is also the seat of power for the Afghan Interim Government, a coalition of six of the seven major Afghan political parties that form an alternative government in exile and which seeks to replace the current government in Kabul. All these major political parties, and other minor parties, are based in Peshawar. The provincial offices of all Pakistani government departments are also located in and near the city, while all matters concerning refugees are handled by the Commissioner for Afghan Refugees (NWFP) [CAR (NWFP)] from a large, new, office complex built in the satellite city of Hyaderabad, just outside of Peshawar. Research in any refugee village requires the permission of the CAR of that province.

RESEARCH OUTLINE

The location and characteristics of Peshawar made it the logical location in Pakistan from which to undertake refugee research. Even so, the first few weeks were spent in the national capital of Islamabad. Both before and throughout this study, availability of suitable data remained a major concern. For this reason, a two stage methodology was adopted, as a way of overcoming deficiencies in data collection that might have been experienced in the other stage. The first was designed to provide a broad macroscopic perspective on Afghans housed in refugee villages in Pakistan, and the second to be a detailed, micro-level study of one particular refugee population in NWFP. Research commenced in May 1990 in Islamabad, where secondary data were collected from various federal government departments, international aid organizations, and development agencies. Data were acquired through both documentary research and interviewing key professional personnel and this process continued after arriving in Peshawar in June.

A major problem developed in Peshawar with the proposed second stage. Although the necessary research visa had been issued by the Government of Pakistan, and an affiliation obtained with the National Institute of Population Studies, formal application to enter a refugee tented village (RTV) was rejected by the CAR (NWFP) on 24 June 1990 on grounds of security. Without permission to enter a village, the second stage of the study was in jeopardy.

During the month I was forced to wait before the original research application could be resubmitted, a number of alternative research strategies were developed. One was to relocate the study to Baluchistan province, in the hope that the CAR (Baluchistan) would be more favorable to this type of research. A second was to conduct more limited

associated with the movements of people, geographers have produced the least research on refugees in primary host communities."

Involuntary migration is clearly within the interests of the population geographer, for it contains the three essential components of geographic mobility outlined by Gould (1988:381) - distance, direction, and scale - and overlaps a number of movement categories and typologies used by geographers. Refugee movements can be classified as a form of international migration, whereas displaced persons are internal migrants. While many involuntary migrants consider their flight to asylum to be permanent, others think it temporary and desire to return to their homeland, in which case their repatriation to places of origin may be viewed as a form of international return migration. Involuntary movements also cover the full spectrum of social units, from individual to family to village.

Research is required on all aspects of the refugee experience. First, the root causes for the mass exodus of people, together with the traumatic and often tragic experiences suffered *en route*, need to be investigated. Beyond these initiating factors, studies should be made of the dynamics of refugee communities, especially their behaviors both upon reaching asylum and upon resettlement, as well as the conduct of host communities towards the displaced persons. Conditions of adaptation, development, and change, given new or substantially unfamiliar surroundings, need to be analyzed to understand the processes, barriers, and problems of refugee adjustment. Furthermore, the factors concerned with their return migration should be examined, such as how displaced or resettled societies react to the prospect of repatriation, what is its impact on host countries, and why refugees may resist returning to their homelands (Zetter, 1988:101-3). All these are research areas within the scope of population geography.

Commentators such as Carpenter (1982:42), Zetter (1988:3), and Harrell-Bond (1988:1) have all stated that refugee situations have been dominated by priorities for physical survival and humanitarian assistance, policy analysis, project appraisal, and program evaluation. While important areas of investigation, the consequence has been a neglect of data collection and research on refugee populations that, according to Harrell-Bond (1988:2), requires "the application of coherent and integrated research strategies which incorporate the knowledge, methods, theories and concepts of a number of disciplines." Zetter (1988:1) makes the same argument, calling for "a much more closely integrated application of the theories and methods of social, political and medical sciences." As an eclectic discipline, geography is well placed to make significant contributions to the study of involuntary population movements and, in particular, of refugee migrations.

EXPLANATIONS AND APPROACHES TO INVOLUNTARY MOVEMENT

Almost all theories concerning migration have been directed towards the phenomenon of "voluntary" movement rather than to the

enquiry of ten or twelve locations for about six days each. A third possibility was to investigate unregistered refugees living in the city of Peshawar, and fourth and final was a study within Afghanistan on why some people had not fled. After these alternative strategies had been discussed with research workers and other professionals in Peshawar and Islamabad, it was decided that the second and multisite approach was the most plausible substitute.

Permission for the original study of one refugee village was rejected by the CAR (NWFP) a second time on 22 July 1990. As soon as this occurred, the alternative proposal was submitted and immediately approved. An itinerary was drawn up by the Additional Commissioner (Relief), with permission given to visit ten conglomerations of refugee villages in five districts of NWFP (Figure 3.1) on set dates (Appendix 1). Length of visit to each was restricted to between two and four days, which meant that the original research schedule was seriously reduced. Instead of spending two to three months collecting field data as intended, visits to refugee village were to be restricted to a five week period.

Originally, it had been proposed to take a simple random sample of registered refugees from one village complex. However, as the ten sites selected by Additional Commissioner Khan included both registered and unregistered refugees, so that the existing CCAR data on registered refugees was inappropriate, and the tight schedule of village visits did not allow sufficient time to devise alternative sampling scenarios. Consequently, there was no utility in pursuing a sample survey for, as Fawcett and Arnold (1987:1531) note, it must have the ability to obtain a representative sample of individuals.


THE ETHNOSURVEY

Given this experience, the ethnosurvey was found to be the most satisfactory method of enquiry. As defined by the sociologist, Douglas Massey (1987), the ethnosurvey is a multisite and multimethod approach that combines in a single study the most salient features of both quantitative and qualitative strategies. Overall, it produces "a body of data with greater reliability and more internal validity than is possible to achieve using either method alone" (Massey, 1987:1504). The five features of its research are: (1) multimethod data collection; (2) representative multisite sampling; (3) multilevel data compilation; (4) life history collection; and (5) parallel sampling.

Qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection can be incorporated in one of four ways. The first is a sequential design, where qualitative techniques precede survey instruments. In the second, parallel design, both methods occur concurrently but separately. The fused approach, the third possibility, combines the most appropriate aspects of both in one design. An interactive approach, the fourth and the one adopted, uses parts of all three previous designs during all phases of research design, data collection, and analysis (Massey, 1987:1505). Specifically, in this study, a questionnaire was both preceded and followed by ethnographic techniques, including participant

FIGURE 3.1

LOCATION OF STUDY VILLAGES, AUGUST 1990



observation, interviews, and archival retrieval. Experience gained from the earlier and open-ended work was reflected in the design of a semi-structured interview schedule, and the decision to abandon a more formal and highly structured questionnaire.

Unexpectedly the selection of field sites, the second element in designing an ethnosurvey, was made by the Additional Commissioner for Afghan Refugees (Relief) (NWFP) [ACAR (Relief)] once permission had been obtained. Ten village sites were to be visited which, although not randomly selected, appear to represent the range of RTVs in NWFP and enable comparative analysis. In the end, interviews were conducted with refugees from twenty-seven of the 343 villages located in Pakistan (Appendix 2), ranging from RTVs established as early as 1979 to others opened as recently as 1989. A further thirteen RTVs were visited as part of the study, although no interviews were conducted with refugees from these villages.

Compilation of multilevel data, embracing the individual, the household, and the community, is the third feature outlined by Massey (1987:1507). Although the individual was the focus of the current study, information on families and village communities was obtained through semi-structured interviews. The large number of household members, together with the fact that discussion with female members was not permitted, prevented detailed information from being obtained from all household members. Interviews with village and tribal elders, along with discussions with RTV officials, also helped construct community profiles.

Considerable difficulties were experienced with compiling life histories, the fourth component of the ethnosurvey. In general, refugees were poor, rural people who had worked since childhood, without wages, so that to construct employment histories was of dubious value. Many were reluctant to answer questions about family members, especially females, which posed an obstacle to compiling family histories. The fact that many Afghan refugees are uneducated and have only a vague notion of chronological age, further complicated the construction of life histories. As a result, efforts concentrated on eliciting migration histories, except that the refugee population proved to be relatively immobile. Only a small number had ever moved from their place of birth before fleeing to Pakistan, while others were found to refer to a province as the "home residence" when it was the location of their family home rather than where they lived. Even so, migration histories were collected to discover if there was a history of high mobility among refugees before the Afghanistan war and if they had travelled previously to Pakistan and, in particular, to the area of resettlement.

In his discussion of the ethnosurvey, Massey (1987:1510) proposed that whenever a social process, such as international migration, "transcends two distinct geographic areas ... contemporaneous samples of migrants in both sending and receiving societies" should be obtained. However, in this instance, war conditions in Afghanistan made it impossible to conduct parallel sampling.

section was concerned with living conditions in RTVs, and sought details on rations, housing, health facilities, education, income, food sufficiency (Appendix 3).

The questionnaire was then translated into Pushtu, the major language of the refugees. An Afghan refugee, fluent in Pushtu, Dari[7] and English, and educated at Kabul University, was selected as an interpreter and field assistant. Lack of time between receiving the completed translation and commencing village enquiries prevented extensive pre-field training of the field assistant, but it was thought that any problems with the questionnaire might better be discussed in the field.

Time constraints also meant that a pilot test of the questionnaire was impossible before leaving for the village sites. As a result, the first one visited became a test for the draft questionnaire and research methodology. The first of two days allocated for the Katcha Ghari refugee villages (Figure 3.1) was spent interviewing village officials and looking at facilities such as the health clinic and retraining programs. Officials arranged a group interview with eight village elders during the second day - an interesting experience but disappointing for its overall results. All questions were answered by one spokesman in the expected political and religious rhetoric, while the whole interview also was recorded by an CAR (NWFP) official. Based on this experience, it was decided not to arrange further group sessions with elders and that the limited time available was more usefully spent interviewing individuals. As a result of minor changes to the questionnaire, these interviews in Katcha Ghari are not reported in the results.

The manner of conducting interviews was consistent throughout all ten sites. Upon arrival at each RTV, an introductory meeting was held with the Village Administrator (VA) and other administrative staff, where the letter was presented from the Additional Commissioner for Afghan Refugees (NWFP), granting research permission. In most instances, the village authorities had received a copy of this letter and were expecting the visit. They supplied details on various aspects of the settlement, and arranged for a security escort to accompany the research team. Occasionally, they were also accompanied by a local administration official, who during informal discussions, supplied additional information about the population and operation of the RTVs.

The research design had always intended to target only male refugees for interviewing, because of the restrictions of *purdah* imposed upon the women. It soon became apparent that the most appropriate strategy was to approach the men in the streets. No set procedure was adopted in selecting for interview one refugee from another among all those walking along the street, although successive interviews always occurred in different locations. The field assistant would introduce the

[7] Dari is a Persian language, and the major language of eastern and parts of northern Afghanistan.

Basically, the original two-stage methodology consisted of acquiring aggregate and individual information. Investigation of patterns of refugee migration was begun in Islamabad and Peshawar and became incorporated into the ethnosurvey once it became clear that village enquiries would be limited. The ethnosurvey that was developed, although not including all five components defined by Massey, achieved the most plausible balance given imposed constraints. Its use of several methods, incorporating aspects of both quantitative and qualitative research strategies, was a major characteristic of field investigation.

In sequence, research enquiries began with collecting secondary data and interviewing key informants to gauge the extent of refugee migration. Although there is a severe shortage of data on refugee flows from Afghanistan, it was possible to determine the scale and patterns of refugee movements between some Afghan provinces and different districts in Pakistan. This information was also beneficial in the design of the instrument for semi-structured interviews. Additional secondary data were required once field details had been collected to both supplement and clarify that information.

A questionnaire, which formed the basis of semi-structured interviews, provided the necessary detail to understand factors that underlie both refugee migration to Pakistan and individual actions of the people involved. Refugees often reacted to questions with a number of inter-related responses, which were encouraged by open discussion. Such information was an effective complement to that data collected from other sources. As intended, the strength of one approach and one set of data compensated for any weaknesses in other approaches and information, with the end result being a matrix of plausible information needed to examine the displacement of Afghan refugees to Pakistan.

PRIMARY FIELD ENQUIRIES

Since details of research strategy could not be decided until permission to visit refugee tented villages had been granted, considerable planning needed to be done under great time pressure. A critical task was to design a short, questionnaire that was open-ended and would solicit information on personal attributes, reasons for leaving Afghanistan, experiences during flight, and subsequent settlement in Pakistan (Appendix 3). The first section was concerned with personal details about each refugee, which included name, age, marital status, place of birth, tribal affiliation, registration details, occupations in 1978 and 1990, and household structure. In this study, the most appropriate and easily translated definition of household was all persons living within the compound walls. The second section sought details about the decision to leave Afghanistan, including place of origin, year of departure, and reasons for flight, as well as details of flight itself, such as route to Pakistan, length of journey, and difficulties *en route*. This was followed by questions directed towards refugees' intentions to return to Afghanistan, and asked for the conditions necessary before repatriation and the preferred destinations and reasons. The final

researcher, outline the nature of the study, and then ask whether the individual would agree to be interviewed. In fact, refugees in RTVs were most willing to express their opinions and only one person refused. About two-thirds of all interviews were conducted in the streets, against a wall or perhaps in some shade in the front of a house or shop, with the remainder occurring the refugee's yard or "guest house". At the end of five weeks, ninety-four interviews had been completed with refugees from twenty-seven refugee tented villages.

The interview routine was for the field assistant to ask open-ended questions in Pushtu, and occasionally Dari, and to translate the responses into English for the researcher to record. Interviews averaged about an hour each. Generally, they commenced with very few, if any, spectators but the longer they progressed, the larger the numbers of men who were attracted, so that often they concluded with a large audience. The responses of those being interviewed did not appear to be influenced by the presence of these extra people who, deliberately, were given an opportunity to comment once formal questioning was completed. This parallels the experience of Connor during her study of Afghan refugees in Peshawar, who observed that the presence of others during interviewing acted as a cross check on the truthfulness of responses (Connor, 1987:108). Many of the refugee observers were highly articulate about many issues and welcomed the opportunity to express their opinions, especially on experiences of flight and resettlement. The completion of the semi-structured interviews generally was followed by informal discussions, varying from fifteen minutes to two hours, many times over a meal supplied by one of the refugees. The village hosts were inevitably most hospitable to the research team, fulfilling the Pushtunwali code of *melmastia*, or hospitality to their guests.

REFUGEE TENTED VILLAGES


An elaborate bureaucratic structure has been established by the Government of Pakistan to oversee humanitarian assistance to the Afghan refugees (Figure 3.2). The center of the relief network is 343 refugee tented villages (RTV), each of which is designed to house a population of 10,000 registered refugees (Appendix 2). The government of Pakistan carefully chosen the designation "refugee tented village", not only to emphasize the assumed temporary status of the refugees but also to avoid any suggestion of guerilla training implied in the term "camp".

Refugee villages have been established continually since the commencement of the Afghanistan crisis, but particularly in response to sudden and unexpected influxes. Demand for accommodation has always exceeded supply and whenever a new settlement becomes established, both new arrivals and longer-established families flood the new location. Segal and Thami (1989:11) claim that between twenty and fifty percent of the new camps are inhabited by those who arrived earlier but had not been registered.

An estimated 11,000 Pakistani nationals are involved in refugee administration at the national, provincial, district, area, and village

FIGURE 3.2

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF AFGHAN REFUGEE MANAGEMENT



Source: G.O.P., 1984:98

levels while an additional 8,500 staff are employed in health, education, and other similar programs (Dupree, 1988:863). In February 1980, responsibility for providing assistance was transferred from the provincial governments of Baluchistan and NWFP to the Federal Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON). The Secretary of that ministry must plan and provide funds and relief goods, as well as interact with such international agencies as UNHCR and the World Food Programme (WFP). The Office of the Chief Commissioner for Afghan Refugees (CCAR), in Islamabad, was established under SAFRON to coordinate and supervise relief operations at the national level (Figure 3.2. Each of the three provinces, Baluchistan, Punjab, and NWFP, has a Commissioner for Afghan Refugees (CAR), responsible for implementing, coordinating and supervising relief operations at the provincial level. Provincial commissioners are under the administrative control of the Home Department of their respective provinces.

At the next lower tier are District Administrators (Figure 3.2), who coordinate relief work within their district or agency. A level of Area Administrators, who oversee operations for approximately five refugee villages, or a registered population of some 50,000, is unique to the NWFP administration. At the local level is the Refugee Tented Village Administrator, responsible for registering and recording refugees, distributing relief goods, security, and all other aspects of village life. Each Village Administrator is supported by sixteen other personnel, including section heads, and clerical and custodial staff.

The principle attraction of a RTV to refugees is the opportunity to be registered and the subsequent entitlement of aid that this status brings. In recent years, the Government of Pakistan has influenced the distribution of refugees by closing registration for extended periods, only re-opening at selected new sites for very short periods, until the village quota was filled. The establishment of settlements such as those at Mianwali in the Punjab district has been a principal means to attract the Afghans away from volatile border areas.

On arrival for registration at a refugee village, a family is provided a tent (*khiyme*), and issued with a monthly ration allocation. Initially, in the early 1980s, the daily ration for every individual consisted of 500 grams of wheat, thirty grams each of dried skim milk and edible oil, twenty grams of sugar and three grams of tea (GOP, 1985:16). Just as international contributions of these provisions to the Government of Pakistan has decreased, so there has been a corresponding fall in their distribution. All registered refugees interviewed during August 1990 received only the wheat allocation.

At the initial interview the refugee status of the family head is authenticated by a representative of one of the seven major Afghan political parties. The administration staff then file a "Record of Registration", which contains a photograph of the head, together with details of all family members. The head is issued with a ration passbook, containing the same details, which is presented monthly to obtain the allocation of aid. Details of each allocation are entered in the

passbook, the loss of which can result in the family not receiving a food allocation.

Of the ninety-four households represented in the study, seventy possessed at least one ration book (average 1.6 passbooks a household), nine had been issued with provisional registration papers, and fifteen remained unregistered. The 112 passbooks accounted for in the study had an average of 6.4 persons in each book. Generally, a family head is only permitted to register a maximum of seven family members including himself. No additional family members are permitted to be added to the passbook after registration is completed, so that adjustments can not be made for births or refugees arriving later. However, the register is corrected for the deaths of any registered refugees. This results in registration figures severely under-representing the actual refugee population. For example, although seventy-four percent of refugees interviewed possessed ration passbooks, it is estimated that only fifty-seven percent of refugees in the households concerned were registered.

LOCATION

As mentioned previously, the location of some RTVs has often been determined by the government to influence the distribution of refugees within the country. However, many other sites were selected by the refugees themselves, based on "tribal, ethnic, linguistic and other such considerations" (Azhar, 1985:60). Most are situated on land either owned by the state or rented by government from Pakistani landlords. Depending on location, the surroundings and conditions of villages vary considerably. A few in the northern and eastern regions are found in pleasant surroundings, have plentiful water and experience mild weather. Most, however, are situated in desolate and ecologically fragile environments of both mountains and deserts, further devastated by the mass influx of people.

In the early 1980s refugee tents covered vast expanses of land, but these have gradually given way to semi-permanent houses built of mud (*katcha*). These dwellings vary from small, one room huts to larger dwellings up to six or seven rooms. Construction techniques are traditional to many parts of rural Afghanistan, with a mixture of mud, water, dung, grass, and wheat stalks being used to form mud bricks, which are dried in the sun. Frequently, a high wall is first built around the yard, to provide some privacy for the women. Then a thick-walled house is constructed with the mud bricks and roofed with wooden beams and straw mats covered with earth, to produce a weather resistant dwelling. Some houses contain a separate guest room, where male friends can visit without disrupting the women. More affluent families often have electricity connected for lighting and ceiling fans.

During summer, many of the refugee villages on the plains had a dusty aura about them. Dry paths weave between high-walled mud houses, with the hot summer winds sweeping up the earth to make the sky the same dusty color. At times, it was difficult to differentiate the

ground, the houses, and the sky as everything had the same *kakhi* hue. This brown coloring dominates the landscape, even in those villages located in the monsoonal belt and in a much more hospitable environment. Torrential downpours occasionally cause havoc by eroding the *katcha* walls, turning roads and paths into quagmires, and flooding the ill-drained settlements.

Refugee villages are self-contained units, each having schools, mosques, bazaars, and health clinics. Most schools are operated by the Government of Pakistan, although some religious schools (*madrassas*) are run by Afghan political parties. Health clinics (known as Basic Health Units), one to every 15,000 refugees, provide such programs as immunization, tuberculosis and malarial control, as well as assisting with potable water, sanitation, and other hygiene improvements. In the bazaar area, rows of shops loosely constructed from wood, canvas and, sometimes, iron form the center of economic activity in the settlement. A wide variety of goods and services are available from butcher shops, general stores, vegetable markets, *chai* (tea) shops, flour mills, wood merchants, bakeries, and blacksmiths. In some villages, schemes such as carpet and weaving factories have been encouraged by NGOs to generate local income. Despite these initiatives, there are few employment opportunities in the villages, and most men are forced to seek work outside the village, generally laboring.

In spite of their rural appearance, RTVs are in fact unique urban settings, whose considerable populations are supported by a vast array of social and economic activities. While many of these enterprises owe their origins to the Government of Pakistan and to voluntary agencies, many others have resulted from the endeavors of refugees themselves.

SETTLEMENT AND POPULATION

To assist administration, each refugee tented village is designed to accommodate a maximum population of 10,000 refugees, or approximately 1,500 families. As already noted, there is a great variation around this norm, with some settlements only a single, isolated village and others massive urban conglomerations, whose populations may exceed 100,000 people from groups of villages clustered together. These conglomerations, such as the massive sprawl of the Panian group (Figure 3.1) where eleven RTVs are clustered together, have made a significant, but largely unrecognized contribution to Pakistan's urbanization. The growth of the refugee population will make them even more significant in future years.

The mean registered size for all refugee villages in Pakistan is almost 9,500 persons, with the average as low as 6,000 persons in Mardan district (Figure 3.1) and as high as 24,000 in Quetta district in Baluchistan. Particular RTVs may be much larger than the district average, as found at Darasamand 1 in Kohat district, which has more than 22,600 registered persons, and Zangal Patai in Malakand district, where there are more than 22,400 (Appendix 2). At the other extreme is the unique settlement of Ghund/Bachalors in Kurram agency, that was

involuntary or forced, such as refugee migrations. The absence of any law of involuntary (and voluntary) migration was noted by the American sociologist William Petersen (1969:289), who commented "... we shall not be able to formulate 'laws', for the empirical regularities do not always hold true." While no such overriding law exists, a number of theories and typologies on involuntary migration have been proposed and these have originated in a variety of academic disciplines - sociology (Petersen and Richmond), social demography (Kunz), and geography (Eichenbaum). As previously noted, this indicates the interdisciplinary nature of the study of involuntary population movements.

One of the first attempts to include involuntary migration in a broader theory of people's movement was made in 1958, when Petersen included involuntary categories within his "General Typology of Migration". Petersen (1969:290) argued that all migration was either innovating, where persons moved "as a means of achieving the new"; or conservative, where "they respond to a change in conditions by trying to retain what they have had, move geographically in order to remain where they are in all other respects." He then went on to define five broad categories that applied to both innovative or conservative situations, designating them primitive, forced, impelled, free, and mass (Figure 1.1).

FIGURE 1.1
PETERSEN'S GENERAL TYPOLOGY OF MIGRATION

TYPE OF INTERACTION	FORCE OF MIGRATION	MIGRATION CLASS	MIGRATION TYPE	
			CONSERVATIVE	INNOVATING
Nature and man	Ecological man	Primitive Ranging	Wandering	Flight from the land
State and man	Migration policy	Impelled Forced	Flight Displacement	Coolie trade Slave trade
Man and his norms	Higher aspirations	Free	Group	Pioneer
Collective behavior	Social momentum	Mass	Settlement	Urbanisation

Source: Petersen, 1969:20

The distinction between impelled and forced migration is that the former involves some retention of power by people in deciding whether or not to leave, whereas the latter does not. Relating the categories of innovative and conservative to the distinction between impelled and forced, Petersen (1969:294) proposed four different types: flight, displacement, coolie trade, and slave trade. Flight and displacement are both viewed as conservative migrations, with the former characterizing people driven from a territory by an invading force and the latter the enforced removal of a dissident population. Migrations that are both innovative and coerced result in transfers of labor (Petersen, 1969:294), with the slave trade involving force to satisfy the supply and the coolie

established solely for single male refugees and houses only 1,500 persons. Other refugee villages, such as Kerala, have also been established for widowed refugee women.

Except for the Kirghiz, all the ethnic groups of Afghanistan's are represented. According to Sliwinski (1989a:46), the Pushtun tribes, the major ethnic group, account for eighty-five percent of all refugees, which indicates a decline from Dupree's (1988:848) estimate in 1984 of ninety-four percent, as increasing numbers of other ethnic groups have arrived from northern Pakistan.

Azhar (1985:61) has reported that in the major host provinces of Baluchistan and NWFP, the average density is about one refugee to every six or seven Pakistanis. However, in such high density areas as Chagai and Isakhel refugees exceed the local population. The variation in these village characteristics are mirrored in the ten conglomerations of villages, located in five districts of NWFP, within which field enquiries were conducted (Figure 3.1).

The population of the two villages of Baghicha, at 10,407 registered refugees, constituted the smallest group, whereas the eleven RTVs of the Panian group accommodated 81,845 persons (Table 3.1). There was similar variation in the size of individual villages, from 22,545 persons in Zangal Patai down to 4,794 at Baghicha's RTV 2.

The first visit was to seven settlements forming the Nasir Bagh group, located on the western outskirts of Peshawar (Figure 3.1). In total, they occupy more than thirty-two square kilometers. Six of the villages, for registered refugees, have a registered population of 48,123 living within 7,279 families (Table 3.1). Another settlement houses 9,547 unregistered persons distributed among in 1,549 families. The unregistered refugees interviewed were on a provisional registration system. Although not issued with ration books by the CAR, they had some documentation concerning provisional registration, and received rations from one of the NGOs.

The two refugee villages which make up the Jalala group are located in a picturesque setting on a river bank, approximately twenty miles west of the city of Mardan, in the district of the same name. Their registered population totalled 22,001 persons in 3,645 families. A number of Dari speaking refugees, who were not registered, were found to have established a separate community nearby, but no details exist about their total numbers. Visiting the two settlements was hampered by heavy rains washing out the bridge leading from the main road.

The two villages of Baghicha, the second group in the Mardan district, are located on a fertile, green plain about twenty-five miles east of Mardan. Heavy rains occurred throughout the district during one day of field enquiries and had flooded large tracts of land, as well as damaging numerous houses. At 10,407 registered refugees composed of 1,718 families (Table 3.1), this was the smallest concentration of all ten field sites.

Zangal Patai, the second largest refugee in all Pakistan, has a registered population of 22,545 persons and 3,089 families. Located in the

TABLE 3.1

POPULATION OF REFUGEE TENTED VILLAGES VISITED: AUGUST, 1990

RTV		Number of families	Total population	Adult males	Adult females	Children
AZAKHEL	RTV 1	2130	5419	2474	1053	1892
	RTV 2	1376	8715	2159	2185	4371
	RTV 3	900	6161	1357	1598	3206
BAGHICHA	RTV 1	924	5613	1098	1304	3211
	RTV 2	794	4794	916	1183	2695
GHAZI	RTV 1	1265	7425	1192	1621	4612
	RTV 2	1715	10571	1549	2568	6454
HAWAI	RTV 1	1475	8491	1710	2149	4632
	RTV 2	1822	10261	2057	2293	5911
	RTV 8	1616	10226	1879	3100	5247
JALALA	RTV 1	1664	9721	1934	2403	5384
	RTV 2	1981	12280	2239	2885	7156
KOGA				2409	4209	7374
	RTV 1	1255	6958			
	RTV 2	1271	7034			
NASIR BAGH[a]						
	Registered	7279	48123	9683	12061	26379
	Unregistered	1549	9547			
PALAI		2680	19477			
PANIAN	RTV 06	1211	7017	1197	1628	4192
	RTV 08	1293	7416	850	1696	4870
	RTV 09	1133	6673	1110	1316	4247
	RTV 10	1250	7340	1200	1448	4692
	RTV 14	941	5591	830	8213	3548
	RTV 15	1070	6299	1015	1137	4147
ZANGAL PATAI		3089	22545	3145	6188	13212
TOTAL		41,683	253,697			

[a] Figures for Nasir Bagh are cumulative for six camps with registered refugees. There is also one camp with unregistered refugees.
No refugees were interviewed from Nasir Bagh RTV2 or RTV6.

Source of data: Personnel communication with RTV officials

district of Mardan, about ten miles west of the small town of Dargai (Figure 3.1), the higher elevation means that it experiences milder weather than that in Vale of Peshawar. A further five miles to the east, in a similar environment, are the two RTVs in the Palai group. Their total population is 19,477 persons found among 2,680 registered families.

The most isolated refugee settlements visited during field enquiries were the two villages of the Koga group, located about midway between Mingora and Mardan in the Swat district (Figure 3.1). Compared with conditions further south, this area experienced both more rain and cooler temperatures. These two communities were divided by a road and contained 13,994 registered refugees in 2566 families.

The three Azakhel RTVs are situated about twenty miles east of Peshawar along the Grand Trunk Road connecting Peshawar to Lahore (Figure 3.1) and stretch for a considerable distance parallel to both the road and railway. From the main road, it is difficult to distinguish the refugee from rural Pakistani villages. The settlement was only moderately crowded - with 20,295 registered persons in 4,306 families. In Azakhel, the ratio of adult males to adult females is far higher than for any other study village, while the ratio of children to adults is small (Table 3.1). As a result, the number of persons per family, at 2.54, is not only the lowest of all settlements visited but also the second lowest for all RTVs in the country.

A further fifteen miles east of Azakhel along the Grand Trunk Road, past the town of Nowshera, are located the eight refugee settlements of the Hawai group. Refugee tented villages 1 to 7 are all older and more established than RTV 8, which is comparatively new, having been established for those who arrived in Pakistan following the Jalalabad offensive of 1989. Each of the villages is clearly distinguishable from the others and distant from the main road. Only three communities, were visited and they house 28,978 persons and 5,148 families (Table 3.1). Hawai RTV8 was the most desolate of all field sites. There was not a tree in sight and most refugees lived in tents spread out over the stony plain, which was interrupted by relatively few *katcha* houses. In mid summer, the heat was extremely oppressive and temperatures soared past 115 degrees Fahrenheit. There was no running or ground water available in the village, so refugees were reliant on a irregular water tanker. The area lacked any physical attractions, and was well-described by Segal and Thami (1989:15), who observed that "anyone who would come to this isolated, arid and burning hot location would have to be truly desperate."

The two Ghazi villages are situated on the banks of the Indus River just below Tarbella Dam, some sixty miles east of Peshawar. Although physical conditions were pleasant, the villagers suffered because there was no electricity and little work available. In total, 17,996 refugees were registered among 2,980 families (Table 3.1).

The largest conglomeration of refugee villages was also the last site visited. Eleven settlements made up the Panian group and were located south of the town of Haripur in the district of Abbottabad (Figure

3.1). Conditions were very crowded and to the casual observer, there were no visible distinctions between the various communities that contributed to such a conspicuous sprawl. In total, 81,845 refugees were registered among 13,824 families. Since this area in eastern Pakistan receives the monsoonal rains, the climate is much milder than further to the west.

DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE

The demographic structure of the Afghan refugee population in Pakistan remains largely unknown, partly because very little research has been conducted and partly because most of that has focussed on particular refugee tented villages. As Nancy Hatch Dupree (1988a:848) comments, when attempting a synthesis from known, but variable and fugitive sources, "All of the ... ratios and percentages have been gleaned from inadequate data, even though much effort has been expended on quantitative enumerations and countless renumerations." Perhaps this indicates that the quantitative strategies adopted have not always been the most appropriate for a refugee population.

According to data compiled from the RTV officials in August 1990, there was an average of 6.09 registered persons per family in the twenty-seven study villages, slightly less than an estimate of 6.2 persons made by the Government of Pakistan and UNHCR, and also below the average of 6.2 and 6.5 reported by Christensen (1984:35). In addition, this figure is significantly lower than the 8.5 persons per family derived by Christensen and Wolf (1988:25) in a more recent survey. Substantial variation in average family size is found in the study villages, from a district low of 2.54 in Azakhel RTV 1, to a high of 7.30 in Zangal Patai RTV (Table 3.1). Since there is a low number of children in Azakhel RTV 1, but a large proportion of males who, uncharacteristically, exceed females by more than 1,400, perhaps this unusually low figure could be explained by a large bachelor/widower population. It must be pointed out that all these averages are derived from data supplied by RTV officials in each village and consequently reflect any inaccuracies inherent in their recording procedures. Furthermore, they are not a true indication of living densities, as they are derived from only registered family members.

During field enquiries, each individual was asked the number of persons living in his compound - defined as the walled area of the dwelling and yard. Christensen and Wolf (1988:25-7) found that normally refugee households included not only family members but occasionally distant relatives and friends, bound together by social, and to a lesser degree, economic relationships. The study by Christensen (1984:35) found that nearly all households were comprised of extended families, of which eighty percent included parents or siblings and the remaining twenty percent consisting of more distant relatives. Surprisingly, only fifty-seven percent of households in the current study consisted of extended families, most comprising of closer kin (parents,

siblings, their families and/or grandchildren) and only three families including persons more distant than a brother's family.

Based on information collected from the ninety-four refugees in twenty-seven villages, the number of persons in compounds varied between five and seventy-one, with a median of nine and a mean of twelve - a range greater than the variation between twenty-five and forty persons reported in the Christensen (1984:35) survey. The more recent study by Christensen and Wolf (1988:25) found that between one and thirty-two persons in a compound, about seventy percent of whom lay close to an average of between six and ten. Similarly, field enquiries concluded that about sixty percent of all households were comprised of ten or fewer persons.

The current study estimated that 1,269 people were living in ninety-four households where a family member was interviewed, for an average of 13.5 persons a household, considerably higher than Government estimates. Another indication of living density is available from information derived from the malarial eradication program operated by one of the non-government organizations. In the village of Baghicha, where the registered population is 10,440 people living as part of 1,718 families, health workers counted 1,110 homes with a total of 3,605 rooms (Austrian Relief Committee, 1989:10). This equates to 9.41 persons and 1.55 families a house or 2.90 persons a room (Table 3.2). However, the population and family figures used are from CAR data and include only the registered population and not unregistered individuals or families. Therefore, actual density levels would be much higher than those calculated here.

TABLE 3.2

HOUSING IN BAGHICHA RTVs: 1989

Total Refugee Population	Number of registered families	Number of houses	Number of rooms	Persons per house	Families per house
10440	1718	1110	3605	9.41	1.55


Source: Austrian Relief Committee, 1989:10

Jones (1985), amongst others commentators, has noted that children dominate the refugee village populations and that adult females outnumber adult men. In NWFP, for example, children aged less than fifteen account for 45.7 percent of the total population, adult females for 28.9 percent, and adult males for a further 25.4 percent. Similarly, in Baluchistan, the figures are 51, 26 and 23 percent respectively (Dupree, 1988a:848). Based on data contained in Sliwinski (1989a:45), in 1987

those aged less than twenty amounted to 58.7 percent of the Afghan refugee population in Pakistan, of whom 29.0 percent were male and 29.7 percent female (Figure 3.3). A further 35.8 percent were aged between twenty-one and sixty years (18.1 percent males, 17.7 percent females); and the remaining 5.5 percent were aged more than sixty-one (2.7 percent males, 2.8 percent females).

FIGURE 3.3

AGE PYRAMID OF THE POPULATION OF AFGHANISTAN, 1979, AND AFGHAN REFUGEE POPULATION IN PAKISTAN, 1987



Source: Sliwinski, 1989a:45

Compared to the Afghanistan population in 1979, there are relatively more males aged 11-20 and all groups aged over sixty-one, as well as females aged less than twenty and more than fifty-one years, in the refugee population. Most notable, however, is the deficit of male and female refugees aged between twenty-one and fifty, especially the men (Figure 3.3). As could be expected, and as has already been discussed, the war has been especially severe on the male population and is reflected, for instance, in male/female ratios of 106.2 in 1979 declining to 99.2 in 1987 (Sliwinski, 1987:45). The sex ratio has also declined because large numbers of Afghan men are fighting in Afghanistan. The overall sex ratio for all twenty-seven RTVs was 75 males to 100 females

(Table 3.1) and in only one village did adult males outnumber adult females (Table 3.1). In the twenty-five settlements for which data was available for adult males and females, as well as children, over fifty-seven percent of the population were children and in all except two of these villages (Azakhel RTV 1, Jalala RTV 2), children outnumbered adults (Table 3.1).

Amongst Afghans, marriage is almost universal. Field enquiries indicate that ninety percent of those interviewed had one wife and five percent had two, while only two percent had never been married. The degree of monogamy is far higher than detected in Christensen's (1984:35) survey of 1984, where it was found that two-thirds of refugee households were monogamous, a quarter were polygamous and one tenth composed of widows' families (Christensen, 1984:35).

Given near universal marriage, fertility levels in prewar Afghanistan were very high, with an estimated crude birth rate (CBR) of 48 per 1,000 and total fertility rate (TFR) of 7.1 births per woman, amongst the greatest recorded (Hobbs, 1988:30). Even these traditional patterns have been exceeded in Pakistan among the refugee population. The general marital fertility rate (GMFR) obtained from Krijgh's (1987:29) survey of 1987 was 400 per 1,000, almost double that recorded for other selected countries (Table 3.3) as substantiated by an extremely high total marital fertility rate (TMFR) of 13.6 births for every woman. According to Krijgh's surveys (1986:13; 1987:4), 'such traditional factors as early and almost universal marriage and a high level of natural fertility have been compounded by the improvements in health conditions, declines in infant mortality and a uniquely supportive environment.

TABLE 3.3

GENERAL MARITAL FERTILITY RATES OF SELECTED COUNTRIES

Country (Year)	Rate
Denmark (1983)	40.3
USA (1981)	61.0
Bangladesh (1981)	161.5
Pakistan (1976)	206.0
Afghanistan (1979)	232.5
Afghan refugees (1987)	400.0

Source: United Nations Demographic Yearbook 1984 cited in Krijgh, 1986:13.

As with fertility, so prewar mortality rates in Afghanistan were amongst the highest in the world. Such demographic indices as a crude death rate of 22.5 per 1,000, an infant mortality rate of 183 for every 1,000 live births and a life expectancy at birth of 41 years, ranked Afghanistan as having among the ten poorest global demographic rankings (Hobbs, 1988:i). In the absence of comparable figures for adult refugees, it is evident from various surveys on refugee health (Boss, Brink and Dondero, 1987; Krijgh, 1986, 1987; Austrian Relief Commission, 1989:5), that both infant and child mortality rates have declined steadily (Table 3.4). In 1987, the infant mortality rate, at 52 per 1,000 live births, is considerably lower than at prewar and even 1984-5 levels, and in fact, is now less than that for the Pakistani population (Krijgh, 1986:8). A similar decline in the neonatal mortality rate, which by 1987 had fallen to 22 deaths per 1,000 live births, has been accompanied by a significant increase in the percentage of children living beyond the age of five years (Boss *et al*, 1987: Krijgh, 1986, 1987).

TABLE 3.4

INFANT AND CHILD MORTALITY RATES OF AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN, 1984-1987

	Year of Survey			
	1984a	1985a	1986b	1987c
Infant mortality rate	156	119	87	52
Neo-natal mortality rate	61	46	21	22
Percent dying before 5th birthday	22.5	18.8	11.8	10.4

Source of surveys:
a - Boss, Brink and Dondero, 1987:557.
b - Krijgh, 1986:4.
c - Krijgh, 1987:10-11.

In 1987, as in previous surveys, diarrhea continued to be the single most lethal affliction for Afghan children and just over half (53%) of all deaths for those less than five years have been reported as related to diarrhea (Krijgh, 1987:12). A further ten percent showed signs of neonatal tetanus at death and another five percent reportedly had measles infection. Of those dying from dual causes of death (10%), about half had suffered from diarrhea and measles and half from tuberculosis and diarrhea (Krijgh, 1987:12). The access of refugees to regular health services is probably greater now than was available in prewar Afghanistan, and accounts for these dramatic declines in mortality rates among Afghan refugees. Especially in recent years, health clinics, health

education, regular inoculations, and antimalarial programs have all contributed to greater survival rates among infants and young children.

Krijgh (1987:30) argues that the refugee population will grow rapidly in coming years should these high levels of fertility prevail and low rates of infant and child mortality continue to decline. Assuming the refugee and registered populations to be one and the same, she projects a yearly level of 320,000 live children, and predicts that by the year 2002 there may be up to 4.5 million refugee children aged less than fifteen years present in Pakistan (Krijgh, 1987:30).

CONCLUSION

Through a system of registration, the Government of Pakistan has endeavored to concentrate refugees together in village settlements, which now dominate large tracts of land in many parts of the country. The tents from which the RTVs derived their name have been slowly, although not completely, replaced by mud-brick (*katcha*) houses. Living conditions are crowded, for both families and the numbers in one household are very large, with extended families often sharing one dwelling.

The relative peace of living in asylum, together with improved health conditions, has seen a population explosion occur among the refugee population. Fertility rates for Afghan women have exceeded their high, prewar levels, at the same time that mortality levels have decreased markedly. Dependency ratios are also very high in the refugee villages, which are dominated by large numbers of children and who generally account for at least half the total population. Should these trends continue during the next fifteen years, then the number of refugees aged less than fifteen is estimated to rise to 4.5 million. Such a situation would constitute a major problem for refugee administrators, planners, and providers, as assistance programs that already are stressed would be expected to absorb even greater burdens. It also emphasizes the continued need for detailed research among Afghan refugees.

This chapter has provided details of both the research strategies and the different environments within which field enquiries were conducted. Based on this discussion, along with prior treatment of the political events that triggered this exodus to Pakistan, it is now appropriate to examine in more detail the flight of Afghan refugees. The next chapter will investigate the migration and settlement of Afghan refugees, using the criteria established by Egon Kunz.

4

REFUGEE FLIGHT AND SETTLEMENT

The four million Afghan refugees who have fled to Pakistan are not a homogeneous group, but include people with many different characteristics, including their specific reasons for fleeing. To understand refugee flight and settlement behavior, it is necessary to identify some of the distinctive associations among these displaced people, such as the classification of five distinct refugee groups made by Rizvi (1988:43), according to socioeconomic attributes of persons at the time of their displacement.

The first of these groups consists of politically prominent and wealthy families who had family, business and/or investment connections overseas, and were able to quickly flee Afghanistan to the cities of Pakistan, but more importantly, to Europe and North America. A second contingent comprises educated Afghans forced to flee the country, especially during the early communist purges, because their political and ideological opinions differed from those of the new elite. Rizvi (1988:43) recognized that many refugees from this group have found employment in and around the refugee villages, particularly teaching in the RTV schools and working for voluntary agencies in refugee assistance programs, which is supported by field enquiries. However, he failed to identify important Afghan political leaders in this category.

Third, are a small number of refugees who fled Afghanistan with their portable assets, such as cash and vehicles, and who have established prominent business enterprises in Pakistan, particularly in the transport sector. The fourth group consists of Afghans who left with small herds of sheep, goats, camels, cattle and yaks. However, these people are not particularly large in number, and stock numbers have been reduced to overcome food shortages, so that little remains to identify them in this group. Instead, they appear to be members of the fifth group of "ordinary Afghans".

"Ordinary Afghans" is the largest group, described by Rizvi (1988:44) as "extremely poor and comprised mainly of old and middle aged men, women and children" from rural areas, who fled Afghanistan because they had no shelter and nothing to eat, after their villages had been attacked, houses destroyed and crops burnt by Soviet or Afghan soldiers.

The ninety-four interviews conducted with Afghan refugees in twenty-seven refugee villages identified men belonging to four of Rizvi's

trade moving people for their labor, but not forcibly. Petersen's classificatory system has been criticized by Richmond (1988:7), because "typologies of this kind fail to go beyond the descriptive level and have little explanatory or predictive value."

The geographer Jacob Eichenbaum takes a different approach, based on the decisions made in both leaving a particular place and selecting another. He argues that society either determines or influences such decisions, with the outcome a nine-category matrix (Figure 1.2), five of which are abstract (Eichenbaum, 1975:22). The remaining four categories he labels as migrants, refugees, allocatees, and slaves, three of which include at least one dimension which is entirely involuntary.

According to Eichenbaum's matrix, refugees are forced to move but can determine their destination; the allocatee contributes to the decision to move but goes to a destination that is externally decided; and slaves have both decisions made for them. Consequently, refugees and slaves are forced to move, whereas allocatees and slaves have no choice about their destination.

Eichenbaum's thesis is that each migrant category contains different influences on the act of movement, but he fails to detail their nature beyond the initiating decision. His work is concerned more with how categories of involuntary migration are differentiated from each other than on what influences lie behind each of them.

FIGURE 1.2

EICHENBAUM'S MATRIX OF HUMAN MOVEMENT

decision to move from origin

to destination	INDEPENDENT OF SOCIETY	INFLUENCED BY SOCIETY	DETERMINED BY SOCIETY
INDEPENDENT OF SOCIETY - PURELY STOCHASTIC	models based only on individual characteristics	Stochastic trends	Ecological model of mobility rates
INFLUENCED BY SOCIETY	Stochastic trends	**Migrants**	**Refugees**
DETERMINED BY SOCIETY	Gravity model of migration	**Allocatees**	**Slaves**

Source: Eichenbaum, 1975:24

The most recent theoretical contribution is Anthony Richmond's (1988) article on sociological approaches to refugee movement, based on his disagreement with prevailing distinctions between voluntary and involuntary movement. Richmond argues that, since all refugees have some alternatives to flight, they must confront the basic decision of whether to stay or move, which lies along a continuum from proactive to

five groups, but no one from politically influential or wealthy refugee families. Although only small numbers of Afghans were recognized in the second, third, and fourth groups, most of those interviewed belong in the final category of 'ordinary Afghans'.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STUDY POPULATION

Rizvi's classifications, while providing an indication of socioeconomic status at the time of displacement, does not reveal the varied characteristics of refugees within each group, or the different experiences of escape, and subsequent settlement in Pakistan. To understand the experience of flight, it is necessary to examine the refugee population in greater detail, which is achieved by focusing on the ninety-four refugees interviewed during field enquiries.

The characteristics of refugees differ considerably, with ages varying between eighteen and seventy-five years. Although, nearly all (ninety-eight percent) of these men are married, and have families of their own, family sizes vary from small nuclear families of three, to extended families of thirty-two. Refugees have fled from ten of Afghanistan's twenty-nine provinces, although nearly forty percent are from Nangarhar, the nearest province to the field study villages (Table 4.1). Every man interviewed during the study was born in rural Afghanistan, and except for three men living in urban areas (two in Jalalabad, one in Kabul), were residing in rural villages prior to their escape. Although most (86.1%, or eighty-one of ninety-four) refugees interviewed were Pushtuns, other ethnic groups including Tajik (9.6%), Arab (2.1%), and Hazara (1.1%), were also evident in small numbers.

TABLE 4.1

PROVINCE OF ORIGIN OF REFUGEES INTERVIEWED

Province of Origin	Refugees Interviewed Number	Refugees Interviewed Percent
Nangarhar	37	39.4
Kabul	10	10.6
Logar	9	9.6
Laghman	9	9.6
Konar	7	7.4
Kunduz	7	7.4
Baghlan	6	6.4
Paktia	5	5.3
Parwon	3	3.2
Tarhar	1	1.1
Total	**94**	**100.0**

Source: Field study, 1990

Discussions with these Afghans revealed most had been involved in agricultural activities when hostilities commenced in 1978, with fifty-one percent (forty-eight out of ninety-four) working as farmers, five percent (five men) as rural laborers, and one percent (one person) a nomadic herder (Table 4.2). Eight of the younger men (8.5%) were still at school at that time, while five elderly men (5.3%) said they were unemployed, being too old to work.

Seventy-two percent (sixty-eight out of ninety-four persons) of those interviewed were in the labor force in Pakistan at the time of field enquiries (August 1990), with the remainder either too old to seek employment (fifteen individuals, or 16.0%), disabled (five persons, or 5.3%), or *mujahids* (six men, 6.4%) who fought in Afghanistan. Most men (29.7%) worked as unskilled laborers in 1990, as it requires little training (Table 4.2).

TABLE 4.2

REFUGEE OCCUPATIONS: 1978 AND 1990

Occupation	1978		1990	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Farmer	47	51.0	1	1.1
Student	8	8.5	1	1.1
Laborer	5	5.3	28	29.7
Unemployed	5	5.3	5	16.0
Malik(elder)	4	4.3	1	1.1
Barber	3	3.2	3	3.2
Shopkeeper	3	3.2	7	7.4
Soldier	3	3.2	-	-
Businessman	2	2.1	1	1.1
Driver	2	2.1	6	6.4
Plumber	2	2.1	-	-
Public servant	2	2.1	-	
Teacher	2	2.1	8	8.4
Engineer	1	1.1	1	1.1
Mullah	1	1.1	-	-
Nomad	1	1.1	-	-
Prosecutor	1	1.1	-	-
Wood merchant	1	1.1	3	3.2
Butcher	-	-	1	1.1
Disabled	-	-	5	5.3
Mason	-	-	2	2.1
Mujahid	-	-	6	6.4
Madrassa assistant	-	-	2	2.1
Party official	-	-	3	3.2
Total	**94**	**100.0**	**94**	**100.0**

Source: Field study, 1990

The mass migration of Afghans into Pakistan has created an extensive labor pool, which has seen Afghan compete against Pakistani for work, with the former undercutting wages for unskilled labor to about twenty rupees a day (US$0.90). Many refugees described how jobs were in short supply, and that they were only able to obtain work periodically, estimated at between ten and fifteen days a month, if they were lucky. Afghans have been freely permitted to work in the Pakistani economy, but there appears to be growing resentment among by some Pakistanis, with unconfirmed reports of fighting breaking out in Peshawar between the two nationalities over work.

Some refugees have ventured into new economic activities in the RTVs, such as the seven persons (7.4%) in the study population who were shopkeepers, selling a variety of inexpensive foods and other goods, the three wood merchants, three barbers, and one butcher. Other refugees provide additional services in RTVs, including eight teachers who taught in the Islamic schools, known as *madrassas*, along with two *madrassa* assistants, and three men who were officials of Afghan political parties.

Also interviewed were six drivers who transported people and goods to and from the RTVs in pick-up trucks and small Mercedes-Benz buses. In Peshawar, there is considerable competition for passengers between Afghan buses and the gaily painted Pakistani vehicles, as they travel the same routes across the city. Some refugees mentioned that the Afghan vehicles are frequently harassed by police about licences, registration and traffic regulations, but this did not appear to deter them. Nor is their any animosity between the two nationalities, perhaps because Pakistanis catch Pakistani buses, and Afghans the Afghan buses. In addition to the buses, small Japanese pick-up trucks are conspicuous travelling between RTVs and nearby towns and villages, usually grossly overcrowded with people.

Six *mujahids* (holy warriors) were interviewed during field enquiries, each in his twenties or thirties, with a bearded face full of character that was topped by a floppy cloth hat. Each of these men radiated a captivating charisma as he retold his experiences fighting against Kabul government forces in Afghanistan for up to six months a year, before returning to their families in the RTVs in Pakistan to recuperate for the remainder of the year. Five other men mentioned that they had previously spent time fighting in Afghanistan, but now remained working in Pakistan all year.


The major assistance provided to refugees, as discussed previously, is the Pakistani government's allocation of aid to registered refugees. However, only seventy-one percent (sixty-seven persons) of the study population were registered with the government, although an additional ten percent (nine men) were on a provisional registration system, and three other men (3.4%) had illegally acquired registration by purchasing ration books on the black market. The remaining fifteen refugees (16.0%) had not obtained registration from the government, either because they arrived in RTVs where registration was closed (six of the

fifteen), did not have money to pay a bribe to government officials to obtain the registration papers (four persons), or had previously been registered, but this had been cancelled by the government (three persons) or their ration passes have been lost and not replaced (two persons).

The original research outline proposed for interviews to be conducted with refugees who fled Afghanistan at different times during the conflict, so that variations in reasons for departure could be analyzed. The results achieved during field enquiries provide an excellent profile, including departures in every year between 1978 and 1989 (Figure 4.1).

FIGURE 4.1

YEAR OF *HEJRAT* AMONG STUDY POPULATION



Source: Field study, 1990

Nearly a third of those interviewed left Afghanistan during the first two years, when internal conflict dominated (11.7% in 1978, 20.2% in 1979). However, the greatest exodus occurred in 1980, immediately following the Soviet invasion, when almost twenty-eight percent (or twenty-six of the ninety-four persons) fled to Pakistan (Figure 4.1). The remaining forty percent who have fled since this climax are distributed evenly over the nine years, except for nearly twelve percent (eleven persons) who escaped in 1983.

Over three-quarters of the men in the study population (seventy-two of the ninety-four, or 76.6%) accompanied their families on the journey out of Afghanistan, including one man made the journey twice, accompanying part of his family on each occasion. Eleven men (11.7%) were forced to flee on their own, including three persons (3.2%) threatened by imprisonment, two men (2.1%) who had escaped prison or military service, and two other men (2.1%) who said they were being persecuted. A further four persons (4.3%) left on their own, but later returned to escort their family out of the country, after finding places of refuge in Pakistan. The families of five men (5.3%) interviewed left the country prior to the family head, who remained in the country either to fight (4.2%), or continue farming (1.1%). The departure of the remaining three families (3.2%) was staggered, with family members leaving in different groups.

The journeys of escape from Afghanistan varied according to distance and mode of transportation, with the shortest journey being three hours undertaken by an elderly man who was driven to the Pakistan border, while the longest was forty-five days (Table 4.3).

The Afghan men told how large numbers of people were fled areas at the same time, with roadways crowded with people. Abdul, a sixty-two year old refugee, said that he "could not count how many other families were fleeing, it was like sands moving in the river, ... everyone was trying to save their life."

TABLE 4.3

DURATION OF JOURNEY FROM AFGHANISTAN

Duration of journey	Refugees Interviewed	
	Number	Percent
<1 day	1	1.1
1 day	4	4.3
2 days	11	11.7
3 days	23	24.4
4 days	6	6.4
5 days	10	10.6
6 days	7	7.4
7 days	5	5.3
8-14 days	15	16.0
15-21 days	6	6.4
22-28 days	3	3.2
29-35 days	2	2.1
>35 days	1	1.1
Total	**94**	**100.0**

Source: Field study, 1990

Nearly two-thirds (63.9%, or sixty out of the ninety-four persons) walked the entire distance out of Afghanistan without any assistance (Table 4.4). A further twenty-three percent (or twenty-two persons) walked out, but had donkeys (21.3%) or camels (2.1%) to assist carrying some women and children. Less than ten percent (9.3%) of all refugees interviewed travelled any part of the journey in a motor vehicle - two persons (2.1%) rode all the way, five (5.3%) walked part way and rode the remainder, and another two (2.1%) travelled part by donkey and part by vehicle. The remaining three (3.2%) refugees rode on camels, or camels and donkeys.

TABLE 4.4

MODE OF TRANSPORTATION DURING ESCAPE

Mode of transportation	Refugees Number	Interviewed Percent
Foot	60	63.8
Foot and donkey	20	21.2
Foot and camel	2	2.1
Foot and vehicle	5	5.3
Camel	2	2.1
Camel and donkey	1	1.1
Vehicle	2	2.2
Vehicle and donkey	2	2.2
Total	**94**	**100.0**

Source: Field study, 1990

Seventy-two percent (sixty-eight men) described hardships encountered on their journeys to refuge, with the most frequently mentioned being hunger, caused by the lack of provisions carried with them, and the scarcity of food available *en route*. Most refugees revealed that they fled their homes "only in the clothes on our backs", and were ill-prepared for the rigors that lay in front of them, which also included the discomforts of cold when travelling in winter, especially over the Hindu Kush mountains, and thirst, which affected refugees in all seasons (Table 4.5).

Apart from the hardships inflicted by climate and topography, there were also those man-made obstacles which hindered journeys, particularly aerial bombardment by Soviet and Afghan forces, which was the second most frequent difficulty, mentioned by twenty-five refugees. The fear of being detected by ground or aerial forces forced eleven men, and their family groups, to travel only at night, and sometimes prohibited them from lighting fires. Despite these efforts to avoid detection, six men and their family groups were ambushed, while another two were captured by Afghan officials, but managed to bribe

their way free. There was also the constant threat of mines, which were encountered by at least four persons. From incidents such as these, seven refugees mention that a person in their travel group was killed.

TABLE 4.5

DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED DURING ESCAPE JOURNEYS, 1978-1989

Difficulty	Number Responses
Hunger	26
Cold	25
Bombardment	25
Thirst	11
Night travel	11
Killings	7
Ambush	6
Mines	4
Exhaustion	3
Sickness	3
Injuries	2
No fires	2
Captured	2
N=127	

Source: Field study, 1990

A critical aspect of field enquiries was to question each Afghan man in the study population on the reasons why he fled Afghanistan, to determine whether these varied at different times during the crisis. One of the most frequent responses cited by refugees is that they fled because the Kabul regime was a threat to their religion (Islam). Mohammad, a thirty-two year old refugee, stated that

when the communists came to power they wanted to bring communism to Afghanistan. They captured religious and educated people, such as *mullahs*, and changed mosque to teach communism. It was a threat to religion, family and women. The articles [decrees] were against Islam. And they killed many Islamic leaders. They wanted to wipe out Islam and drink communism.

This attitude is typical of the many refugees in the study population, with fifty men mentioning they left because the government posed a threat to Islam (Table 4.6). This belief was more prevalent among those refugees who fled in the early years of crisis, (by eight men

who left in 1978, sixteen in 1979 and fourteen in 1980) compared to only twelve persons in the remaining nine years.

The Russian occupation was the second most frequent reason for fleeing, mentioned by thirty-nine Afghan men, with 1980 again the main year of exodus (Table 4.6). Aerial bombardment has forced a great number of refugees to flee, and was mentioned twenty-six times by men in the study population. Other war-related incidents, including killings, fighting, and searches were mentioned on numerous occasions as reasons for departure. Furthermore, many Afghan men led their families out of the country because they felt their women were threatened my Kabul and Soviet soldiers, and told of horrific tales of brutality to substantiate these fears.

TABLE 4.6

REASONS FOR FLEEING AFGHANISTAN, 1978-1989

Reason for flight	Number of responses
Government against Islam	50
Russian occupation	39
Bombardment	26
Threat to women	16
Fear/forced	15
Decrees	12
Killings	11
Search and seizures	6
Fighting	5
Security	4
Fear of imprisonment	3
Destruction of agriculture	2
Betrayed	1
Difficulties	1
N=192	

Source: Field study, 1990

These multiple responses provided a basic understanding on why people left Afghanistan, but not details of specific events. Therefore, a second question probed for more details, with seventy-nine of the ninety-four (84.0%) persons in the study population providing specific information. These indicate that nearly all refugees interviewed fled because of specific war events, rather than the threat to Islam evoked in the previous question. It is thought that refugees stated religious threat as a reason for fleeing because, as is discussed in more detail later, flight due to religious persecution is sanctioned under Islam, with any person undertaking *hejrat* held in high esteem.

Specific events in the war, such as bombardment (twenty-nine responses), village being attacked by ground forces (twenty-eight replies), killings (twenty-seven answers), and destruction of house (eighteen response) were detailed during interviews as specific events which had caused refugees to fled, and account for more than three-quarters of all reasons given (Table 4.7).

TABLE 4.7

SPECIFIC EVENTS WHICH CAUSED *HEJRAT*, 1978-1989

Reason for flight	Number of responses
Bombardment	41
Village attacked	32
Killings	27
Destruction of house	18
Fear of imprisonment	6
Escaped/released from custody	5
Faced hunger (famine)	5
Search and seizures	4
Conditions not good	3
Threat to women	2
Threat to Islam	2
Threat to our lives	2
People captured	2
Injured	1
Decrees	1
Forced to fight	1
N=152	

Source: Field study, 1990

The devastation, and loss, suffered from such attacks is summarized by the ordeal of Abdul, a fifty-nine year old refugee, who retold his story. He stated

> We were sitting in my house when they [Soviets] bombarded us. They destroyed the house and martyred two brothers. I had no money and no job to rebuild the house. Anyway they would have destroyed it again. They were the enemy of human beings; they killed lots of people, especially educated people.

As part of the Soviet depopulation policy, villages were often subjected to constant barrages of bombardment. Abdul Rahman recalled how the

Russians came and bombarded his village continuously for sixty days, before the shelling finally stopped and they could escape.

In addition, many villages were also attacked by Afghan and Soviet ground forces, who were particularly brutal, as thirty-six year old Fazel describes:

> Week after week the Russians came to our village and took people away for military service. They entered houses without permission, opened possessions and took belongings. They beat children. We feared atrocities would occur to women. They took jewelry from women. Some resisted and were shot. The Russians shot people who tried to escape. The government got information that there were *mujahideen* in the village and came to the village, besieged us, bombarded us, and killed many people.

The specific events triggering flight were cross-tabulated against the year of departure to produce a familiar pattern of refugee movement, which again emphasizes the intervention of Soviet forces into Afghanistan. The analysis reveals that village attacks, bombardments, and killings all peaked in 1980, with more than a third (36.6% or fifteen of forty-one refugees) of those mentioning bombardment leaving in that year, and surprising, as many (thirteen) fleeing prior to 1980 as post-1980. Seven of the thirty-two refugees fleeing because of attacks on their villages left in the first two years of conflict, with a further nine leaving in 1980, and another sixteen persons in the following nine years. Both killings and destruction of houses are associated with these previous reasons for departure, and also peak in 1980 (eight and four respectively), although both are more evenly distributed over latter years.

This analysis of the study population has provided sufficient background of refugee characteristics and their reasons for fleeing Afghanistan. It is now possible to try and place these characteristics within the Kunz theory.

AFGHAN REFUGEE MIGRATION AND THE KUNZ THEORY


FLIGHT-ARRIVAL PATTERNS

Refugee flight from Afghanistan has occurred in the three types of movements proposed by Kunz's (1973) kinetic model - anticipatory, acute, and intermediate. The first Afghans to flee were anticipatory refugees, who left the country before the military and political situation prevented their orderly departure, following what Kunz (1973:132) labels a "*push-permit*" model, where flight depends on finding a country willing to accept them as refugees. However, refugees from Afghanistan were freely accepted in Pakistan and Iran under Islamic tradition, so that "landing-permits" were not required. The exact numbers of anticipatory refugees is unknown, as many fled directly to third countries such as the United States or Canada, while others settled in Pakistan's major cities.

Anticipatory refugees, according to Kunz (1973:143), are generally comprised of balanced family groups, with wealthy, educated, and alert household heads aged between thirty and sixty years, much the same as the description of politically prominent and wealthy refugee families

FIGURE 1.3

RICHMOND'S PARADIGM OF INTERNATIONAL POPULATION MOVEMENTS



Source: Richmond, 1988:21

identified by Rizvi (1988:42). The ethnosurvey did not identify any refugees in this classification, probably because they have settled in cities and overseas, and not in RTVs.

Kunz (1973:132) argues there is no mistaking the dominant "push" component in acute movements, where the emphasis is on escape because of the unendurable conditions in the country. This is supported by earlier analysis of events leading to *hejrat* (Table 4.5), which revealed most Afghan men in the study population fled following sudden military conflicts, such as bombardment and ground attacks.

Acute refugee movements do not fit the normal "*push-pressure-pull*" dynamics of migration, because although "the 'push' factor is overwhelming and the 'pressure' is intense, the 'pull' is either lacking in spontaneity or is totally absent" (Kunz, 1973:134). Kunz saw refugees plunging at an offer of settlement, instead of reacting to pull forces, and labelled it "*push-pressure-plunge*." Afghans did not have to wait for an offer of settlement, so their was no "plunge" movement, although both the "push" and "pressure" were intense.

The third classification of intermediate refugees is applicable to some Afghan men interviewed during field enquiries, who exhibited characteristics of both anticipatory and acute categories, and fled in response to "push-pressure-pull" factors. These refugees fled because of fear and anticipation of events, as occurred in anticipatory movements, but not specific events as with acute displacement. Furthermore, the prospect of asylum in Pakistan may have acted as a pull factor, to relieve the pressure that had built up.

ASSOCIATIVE PATTERNS

There were considerable differences in people's interpretations of, and reactions to, the crisis within Afghanistan, so that refugees fled at different times in what Kunz (1973:137) labelled "vintages", or associative, departure cohorts. Different vintages do occur in anticipatory refugee movements, but are most prevalent in acute refugee situations, where each vintage is "distinctly different in character, background and avowed political faith" (Kunz, 1973:137).

Six broad refugee vintages are noticeable in the study population, using date of, and reason for, departure as the main criteria. The first three vintages include all refugees who left Afghanistan between 1978 and 1979, because of religious beliefs, political persecution, or the fighting. The second cluster of vintages left following Soviet intervention at the end of 1979, with vintages again defined on religious, political, and warfare grounds.

These vintages, however, are far broader than those identified by the refugees themselves, because it is difficult for outsiders to recognize the characteristics relevant to the displacement experience which identify each cohort. Some Afghan men mentioned specific departure cohorts, especially the recently arrived "Sukkur 20" refugees, named after rockets used by *mujahideen*, because they fled only because of the rockets, and not because of a threat to Islam, like earlier groups. Even

this vintage could be further defined, such as those refugees who fled Jalalabad following the 1989 offensive.

FORM OF DISPLACEMENT

An important aspect of Kunz's (1973:141) theory are the twelve displacement sub-groups, which are clustered in four groups according to the manner of exodus (Figure 4.2). The first of these displacement sub-groups is "anticipatory movements", which incorporates "door-to-door" type refugee migration. In addition to high educational and other characteristics previously describing this group, Kunz also recognizes that they are comprised of balanced family groups, with heads mostly in the thirty to sixty age groups.

The second category is "displacement by flight", which incorporates two displacement sub-groups of refugees - those who fled in "mass flight", as well as those that left in "individual or group escapes", with the former refugees impelled by immediate fear and in reaction to "overwhelming and concentrated push situations ... caused by the sudden turn of events". This category is appropriate for most Afghans interviewed during field enquiries, who fled in reaction to specific military operations designed to "push" large numbers of Afghans across the border and into Pakistan. Kunz (1973:143) argues this displacement group is characterized by low levels of masculinity[8], together with the over representation of old and young, (Figure 4.2), which is evident in the RTVs, caused by high male mortality rates, together with large numbers of Afghan men still fighting in Afghanistan, substantiate Kunz's argument.

"Individual or group escape" also includes refugees who fled as a result of acute situations, but in contrast to "mass flights", group sizes are limited, comprising predominantly educated males in the active years, in planned escapes. Three younger men out of the ninety-four Afghans in the study population had deserted from military service in the Afghan army and escaped to Pakistan in a movement appropriate to this planned displacement category.

The second major category is "displacement by force", which incorporates eight displacement sub-groups moved outside Afghanistan "either under the force of discipline or subdued by organized force" (Figure 4.2). Although the demographic characteristics of "civilian evacuees" are similar to those of "mass flight" escapees, no Afghans interviewed belong in this group, as no persons were forcibly "moved" outside the border of Afghanistan. However, refugees in the "army in flight or pursuit" group are evident in the study population, comprising *mujahids* who had been fighting in Afghanistan and withdrew to rest in Pakistan. Furthermore, both "separated army units" and "P.O.W." groups are appropriate to the Afghan situation, although no persons

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[8] Kunz used the term masculinity to refer to the male-female balance in the refugee exodus.

FIGURE 4.2

FORM OF INITIAL REFUGEE DISPLACEMENT

REFUGEE MOVEMENT			REFUGEE CHARACTERISTICS		
KINETIC TYPE		FORM OF DISPLACEMENT	MASCULINITY	AGE	EDUCATIONAL
Anticipatory		Door-to-door type refugee migration	Balanced, family groups	Heads of families, mostly in the 30-60 age groups	High to very high
Acute	Displacement by flight	Mass flight	Balanced: in wars low masculinity	All ages: in war, old and young over-represented	Cross section
		Individual group escape	High to very high masculinity	Active age groups predominate	Strongly biased towards higher education
Refugee	Displacement by Force of Discipline	Civilian evacuees	In active age groups, almost totally female	Children and old predominate	Highest educational strata almost totally absent. Otherwise cross section.
		Army in pursuit or flight	Almost all male	Active age groups	Cross section
		Separated army units	All male	Active age groups	Cross section
Movements	Displacement by Force	P.O.W.	All male	Active age groups	Cross section
		Expellees and population transfers	Balanced or slightly low masculinity	All age groups, old and young slightly over represented	Depending on policies and areas involved
		The Banished	High masculinity	Active age groups predominate	Usually high to very high
		Forced labor	High masculinity or depending on policies	Active age groups including youths	Cross section depending on policies
		Deported and concentrated	Depending on policies	Depending on policies	Depending on policies
	Displacement by absence	Displacement by absence	balanced to slightly higher masculinity	Active age groups predominate	High to very high

Source: Kunz, 1973:143

belonging to them were identified among the study population. It is probable that refugees who fled after incarceration in Afghanistan's infamous prisons belong in the "deported and concentrated" category that Kunz proposes.

The remaining three sub-groups (Figure 4.2) are not evident in the study population, although evidence of some groups is mentioned in the literature, such as "The Banished", which is appropriate for describing Afghan political leaders, including Karmal and Najibullah, who were expelled to Moscow. There are also reports on Afghan children being sent to the U.S.S.R. to study at Soviet institutions, who could either fit the "expellees and population transfers" or "forced labor" groups.

Refugees in the "displacement by absence" group were not interviewed during field enquiries, although religious leaders who had left Afghanistan during President Daoud's rule, and remained in asylum when the communist coup occurred in 1978, are evident in the refugee population at large.

HOME RELATED FACTORS

Kunz (1981:42) also recognizes that social relationships of refugees with the population of their country of origin plays an important role in refugee flight and settlement, identifying identification/marginality, attitude to flight and homeland, and ideological-national orientation abroad as the three major "home related factors" (Figure 1.4). The "majority-identified" group is comprised of refugees who identify themselves with the nation, but not the government, and are convinced that their opposition is shared by the majority of their countrymen. This unity is evident among refugees in the study population, and almost all those interviewed would be classified as "majority-identified".

The "events-alienated" group, defined by Kunz (1981:43) as "people whose marginality was latent or suppressed but came to the fore in a sequence of events", was initially thought to include "Sukkur 20" refugees, as their association with the refugee population arose only after they were displaced from their towns by the *mujahideen*. However, because they are not permanently alienated from the remainder of the refugee population, but live in the refugee villages with other refugee vintages without animosity, suggests that they are not members of this group. Furthermore, they also have a strong desire to return to Afghanistan, unlike true "events-alienated" refugees who exhibit little desire for repatriation. The third group in Kunz's theory is "self-alienated" refugees or "exiles", who do not identify with the nation because of strong ideological motives. All the men interviewed maintained strong attachments to Afghanistan, so they would not belong in this category.

The second "home factor" is the attitudes of refugees toward displacement, which classifies them either as "reactive fate-groups" or "purpose groups", with the flight of the former being distinguished as a sudden and reluctant response to a situation considered intolerable and without any foreseeable solutions. In contrast, "purpose group" refugees

become estranged because their struggle for a society brought harassment and persecution. The sudden revolutionary change and war conditions that have devastated Afghanistan are typical of conditions which produce "reactive fate-group" refugees, including those interviewed during field enquiries who left because of bombardment and other military actions. These men were also recognized as "majority-identified" refugees, with a small number of "event-alienated" also present, as originally proposed by Kunz (1981:44).

"Purpose groups" are comprised of either "self-fulfilling purpose groups" or "groups of revolutionary activists", with the former alienated by their insistence on the overriding importance of a certain facet of belief, dogma, or by their passionate pursuit of a form of society which derives its framework from minority ideologies inconsistent with those current in the home society (Kunz, 1981:45).

This criterion is appropriate for those religiously motivated refugees evident in the study population, who fled because of the threat to Islam, and their desire to live within an Islamic society, which has been destroyed in Afghanistan.

The *mujahids* interviewed during field enquiries fit the "groups of revolutionary activists" category, as they have actively engaged in revolutionary activities against the Kabul government, as have the leaders of the Afghan political parties exiled in Peshawar. Most of the men interviewed would probably call themselves revolutionary activists, even if they have never been involved in the fighting.

The two purpose groups are only distinguished by the manner of their opposition against the Marxist regime, with the revolutionary activists physically fighting Kabul forces, while the self-fulfilling refugees opposition is in dialogue. Field enquiries identified refugees who were displaced because of their religious beliefs, and later adopted a revolutionary spirit to regain their Islamic society, which suggests that there is an overlap between the two categories.

It is difficult to label different refugee displacement groups of refugee flows many years after the event fled, and when full details of their experience are not known. These difficulties were compounded by definition problems emanating from Kunz's lack of guidelines.

"Ideological-National Orientation in Exile" is the third set of home factors, consisting of six categories, of which "restoration activists" were most apparent in the study population. Many of the ninety-four men interviewed discussed their desire to restore one of previous political systems regimes in Afghanistan. One group wished to restore the monarchy of King Zahir Shah, who ruled Afghanistan from 1933 until being deposed by Daoud in 1973, while others prefer reestablishing the presidential democracy that existed under President Mohammed Daoud (1973-79). A third faction prefers to establish an Islamic state of Afghanistan, rather than any previous government.

Many refugees in the study population are also recognized as "revolutionary activists", because they are alienated from mainstream ideologies of Kabul, and are fighting to replace this with an Islamic

doctrine. There is considerable overlap between this group and the "restoration activists" mentioned above. "Eager assimilationist" refugees were not evident among those men interviewed, although some successful Afghan businessmen in the Pakistani cities may belong in this group. It is possible to recognize a small number of "passive hurt" refugees in the study population who have retreated from fighting and political struggle in Afghanistan and settled quietly in the refugee villages in Pakistan. The ill-defined "integration seeking realist" group appears to be less applicable to the Afghan situation, as few families achieve "an integrated accommodation with the host society which is consistent with their past and present" (Kunz, 1981:46). Although many refugees fled Afghanistan because of their desire to live in an Islamic society, they are not in the "founders of idealist colonies" category.

HOST RELATED FACTORS

Refugees are rarely aware of the critical role played by the "host related" factors, including cultural compatibility between refugee and host, population policies enacted by the host government, and the social receptiveness of the host community. Evidence from field enquiries supports Kunz's proposition that cultural compatibility is the most important of these factors. Few Afghan refugees settling in NWFP and Baluchistan have been hindered by linguistic barriers, as Pashtu and Baluchi are spoken in these provinces. Linguistic problems do occur, however, especially among Dari speaking Afghans. Some refugees discussed during interviews how they do not receive the same treatment as the Pushtu speaking majority, and are frustrated because nearly all services, such as the administration and health services, are geared towards the majority. Furthermore, they have fewer employment opportunities because of the language difficulties, which makes their lives even more difficult. A language problem was also evident among the few well educated Afghans in the study population, who have difficulties obtaining appropriate employment because they do not speak Urdu, the national language of Pakistan. English language classes have been initiated by some aid agencies in Peshawar to assist refugee employment prospects. Many of the younger refugee children also learn Urdu, as well as and Pushtu, in schools operated by the Pakistani government.

The increased arrival of other ethnic groups, such as Uzbeks, Turkmen, Nuristanis, Tajiks and Hazaras, who do not speak Pushtu has increased language problems, with Boesen (1985:18) suggesting that these communication difficulties have led to conflicts between locals and non-Pushtun refugees such as Tajiks and Hazaras.

The Islamic religion is the most important cultural bond between Afghan and Pakistani, influencing the behavior of both refugee and host. The historical and religious significance of flight into asylum is derived from Prophet Mohammad's flight from Mecca to Medina in 622 A.D., and sanctions a persecuted person to flee and seek asylum in another land of

Islam. Refugee flight (*hejrat kardan*) is mentioned in numerous *Hadiths*[9] in the Koran, such as Sura 8, 72-74 (cited in Mellah, 1985:37), which states

> Those who believed,
> And adopted exile,
> And fought for the Faith,
> With their property
> And their persons,
> In the cause of God,
> As well as those
> Who gave (them) asylum
> And aid, - these are (all)
> Friends and protectors,
> One of another ...
>
> Those who believe,
> And adopt exile,
> And fight for the Faith ...
> As well as those
> Who give (them) asylum
> And aid, - these are (all)
> In very truth the Believers ...

A person who flees is known as a mohajer, which signifies that the individual has made an important sacrifice for his faith. It does not symbolize that they have given up the struggle, but merely undertaken "a momentary tactical retreat preceding return and reconquest" (Centlivres and Centlivres-Demont 1988:146). A *mohajer* is often considered as the other side of a *mujahid*, with Afghans referring to themselves as *mohajer* when they arrive in Pakistan, but as *mujahid* when they return to fight in Afghanistan.

The acceptance of the Afghan *mohajer* by the Pakistani *ansar* (hosts) is in accordance with Islamic tradition derived from those in Medina who assisted the exiled from Mecca. According to this code of behavior outlined in the Koran, Afghan refugees are brothers in faith to the Pakistani people, and expect to be welcomed and offered assistance (Boesen, 1988:221).

Other cultural factors, such as values, traditions, political structure and interpersonal relations, are often common to many refugee and host, especially between the Pushtuns, who embrace notions of hospitality (*melmastia*), refuge (*nanawatia/nanawati*) and asylum (*panah*) in the *Pushtunwali* (Centlivres and Centlivres-Demont, 1988:147). Barth (1969:117-134) identified further cultural vales shared between Afghan and Pakistani Pushtun, including the reliance on tribal council (*jirga*) for the resolution of disputes and decision-making, the maintenance of female seclusion (*purdah*), and "male autonomy and egality, self expression and aggressiveness in a syndrome which might be summarized under the concept of honor (*izzat*)".

According to Edwards (1986:316), these cultural linkages between Pushtuns means the act of fleeing Afghanistan and seeking asylum in Pakistan does not carry the traumatic cultural dislocation usually

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9 Inspirational prophetic traditions which express the thought of the Prophet Mohammad.

Pakistan does not carry the traumatic cultural dislocation usually associated with refugee movements. He argues that tribes in both countries have traditionally escaped from political and judicial retribution by crossing the border and seeking asylum among Pushtuns living on the other side, and cites the legendary kidnapping of the British woman Molly Ellis in 1923. Furthermore, he mentions how tribes have gained economic benefits from the permeability of the border through various forms of trade and commerce, both legal and illegal. Discussions with refugees during field enquiries revealed that this mobility is not widespread among the refugee population, with only nine percent (eight out of ninety-four) of those interviewed ever visiting Pakistan before the crisis. Furthermore, Edwards has not considered the cultural dislocation suffered by an increasing proportion of non-Pushtun tribes in the refugee population, or those Pushtuns, and other ethnic groups, forced to settle outside Pushtun tribal lands, in areas such as the Mianwali district of the Punjab province. During field enquiries, the discussions with the rural Afghans revealed they have strong bonds with their family lands, and the loss of these has been distressing and, according to Boesen (1988:229), threatens their honor and autonomy, both essential values to a Pushtun.

POPULATION POLICIES

The policy to allow Afghan refugees to settle within Pakistan was permitted by the late Pakistani ruler, General Zia-ul-Haq, in accordance with Islamic doctrine. Not only did Zia allow refugees to settle along the border, he supported the resistance movement and turned a "blind eye" to refugees returning to Afghanistan to fight. Because of his actions, Zia is held in high esteem, and many Afghan houses visited during field enquiries displayed his picture on their walls. This basis of this settlement policy may not have been solely because of religious and humanitarian motives, but also due to covert objectives, such as entrenching a hostile "refugee-warrior community" between the Soviet/Afghan forces and the Pakistan population to act as a deterrent to further Soviet advancement (Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo, 1986:165).

A number of Pakistani government policies have been implemented in recent years to influence the distribution of refugees within Pakistan. Foremost amongst these is the use of periodical registration procedures in various parts of NWFP, Baluchistan and Punjab provinces, to attract refugees to certain villages. The government has also established RTVs in certain regions, such as Mianwali district in Punjab province, and resettled refugees away from the border regions to those villages. Twenty-one percent (twenty out of ninety-four refugees) interviewed told how they arrived at their current RTV in accordance with a government of Pakistan's directive, while a further third (thirty-one refugees) moved in hope of obtaining refugee registration. Three refugees discussed how entire refugee populations from other locations had been resettled by the government following disturbances between refugees and the local population.

Unsubstantiated reports state that some refugees have been forced to transfer to less densely inhabited areas, such as Mianwali area in Punjab province, to relieve the pressures of overcrowding which have devastated existing fragile environments.

The Pakistani government, in cooperation with UNHCR, also introduced a trial repatriation program between August and October, 1990. This policy, designed to encourage Afghans to return to Afghanistan, provided a cash incentive of Rs.3,300 together with a three month ration allocation, to all registered refugees who returned to home and forfeited their ration pass. However, it was a dismal failure, with RTV administrators stating that only a handful of the expected 500,000 refugees were taking advantage of the offer.

The population policies adopted by the Pakistani government have considerable influence on refugees' lives, yet there is little comment on them by the refugees. No refugee interviewed expressed any anger at the registration procedures enforced upon them, and all were happy to comply with whatever was required for them to obtain registration, thankful to the government and people of Pakistan for allowing them to live in peace in another Islamic country.

These population policies enacted in Pakistan do not fit Kunz's (1981:48) theory, which argues that "overpopulated or demographically self-sufficient countries" are not expected to accept large numbers of refugees. But four million refugees have fled to Pakistan, making it the largest refugee host country in the world. The cultural factors, such as the Islamic traditions of refuge and asylum, have been an overriding factors in the formation of population policies in this host country.

The last of the three host related factors proposed by Kunz (1981:49) is the social receptiveness of the host community, which can be either monistic (assimilationist), pluralistic (integrationist) or tolerant. Kunz expects that multiethnic, pluralistic societies to be integrationist, but this has not occurred in Pakistan, because most refugees already share characteristics with one of Pakistan's ethnic groups, particularly Pushtun, but also Baluchi. The Afghan Pushtun has been welcomed by the NWFP populace because it increases the Pushtun majority in the province, and gives the tribal group greater significance nationally. There have not been demands for assimilation or conformity, as occurs in a monistic societies, partly due to the cultural similarity between refugee and host. The tolerant, sanctuary nature of the host Pakistani community is a further reflection of the dominance that religion has played in this crisis, with Pakistanis successfully fulfilling the role of hospitable *ansar* to the *mohajerin* from Afghanistan.

SOCIAL ATTITUDES

Discussions with Pakistanis during field enquiries indicated that this hospitality may be faltering, as conflicts and resentment between the Afghan and Pakistani increase. Some were concerned at the continued Afghan presence in their country, and the costs which they

have had to bear. This is supported by Boesen (1988:227), who noticed additional population pressures on the environment in the tribal lands have disturbed the ecological balance and resulted in competition for basic and scarce resources, such as water, firewood, and pasture, and often caused conflicts. There is also considerable resentment in the employment market, where refugees have undercut the wages for unskilled labor, and in the transport sector, where an estimated 6,000 Afghan vehicles are on Temporary Registration licenses, and probably an equal number of Afghan-registered, competing against Pakistanis (Boesen, 1988:228). Some Pakistanis begrudge the provision of aid and services, such as health care, offered to the Afghans, arguing that refugees are provided with better facilities than the local population. This can be supported by evidence produced in Chapter 2, which shows that infant mortality rates for the refugee population had been reduced to levels lower than those for the rural Pakistani population.

The longer refugees remain in asylum in Pakistan, the greater strain in their relations with the local population will become. It is evident that relations have already begun to deteriorate, as refugees become more involved in economic activities outside of the refugee villages, and in direct competition with Pakistanis. As the number of Afghan refugees forced to obtain employment in the Pakistani economy grows, tensions between the two populations can also expect to increase.

THE PREDICTIVE HYPOTHESES OF THE KUNZ THEORY

The final component of Kunz's theory is a list of predictive hypotheses and postulates drawn from previous refugee movements. As a result of field enquiries, and other information, it is possible to test ten out of a total of fifteen hypotheses outlined by Kunz.

First, Kunz (1981:49) hypothesized that the overwhelming majority of anticipatory refugee migrations were composed of "the informed, well-to-do and well educated" persons. However, no anticipatory refugees with these characteristics were identified in the study population, so that it is difficult to evaluate this hypothesis, although evidence from other literature favors this argument.

The second hypothesis proposes that a large proportion of anticipatory movements is comprised of "events-alienated" persons. The only anticipatory refugees identified during field enquiries were a small number of men who left Afghanistan early in the conflict because their Islamic beliefs were threatened by the new government. However, they all expressed a strong desire to return to Afghanistan as soon as conditions improved, a attribute not usually found among events-alienated. It is possible that many of those anticipatory refugees who fled to developed countries have permanently alienated themselves from their fellow countrymen and will not want to return, which supports Kunz's prediction.

Acute movements of reactive fate-groups tend to heighten emotions, according to Kunz (1981:49), as "the identification of the

reactive (Figure 1.3). A horizontal axis distinguishes political from economic motivations. Various categories of migrants are identified in the different quadrants according to these dominant influences - proactive or reactive, sociopolitical or economic - but Richmond provides no indication of the degrees of motivation present within each.

The argument, that involuntary migrants have alternatives to taking flight, is both instructive and problematic. Although some persecuted people may have the option of relocating within their own country, in many instances there is little alternative but to flee. Alternatives such as electing to remain in the particular locality or moving within the same country do not necessarily remove threatening forces, especially if derived from military or political considerations. Generally, to survive, such people are forced to cross national boundaries and seek shelter in a neighboring country. Thus Richmond's model does not explain adequately why individuals choose one alternative resolution over another, nor how much of any one motivation is required for a migrant to be placed in a certain category, or to distinguish one kind of involuntary migrant from another. Whereas the model indicates that displaced persons are not nearly as reactive as conventional refugees, it could be argued the only difference is that the latter cross an international border. It is also difficult to agree with Richmond's proposition that, for some people like slaves and refugees, the option of death is a realistic alternative to movement.

The most comprehensive sythesis of refugees in flight has been presented by Egon Kunz, a social demographer whose thinking has come to be recognized as the cornerstone of theory in involuntary migration. Refugee flight and subsequent patterns of settlement were classified by Kunz (1973:131) into three broad sets of factors; displacement, home-related, and host-related (Figure 1.4). With respect to factors of displacement associated with refugees, this model rests on the thesis that different push-pull motivations operate at points of both origin and destination. Kunz (1973:130) recognized that the refugee is differentiated from the voluntary migrant by "the reluctance to uproot oneself, and the absence of positive original motivations to settle elsewhere." Whereas "pull" motivations are dominant in voluntary migrants, they are virtually absent among refugees, for whom the "push" component is overwhelming.

Kunz (1973:131) classified refugee movements as either anticipatory or acute, with the former referring to people who fled before deteriorating conditions in the home country prevented orderly departure and who generally arrived in a country of asylum with some knowledge of the language, some finances, and some awareness of how to enter a particular trade or profession. It was recognized that some anticipatory refugees may appear to be following the same pattern as the "free push-pull migrant", but Kunz considered them different because the "pull" component played little part in the movement decision. An anticipatory refugee is not responding to push-pull motivations but rather following a

majority identified becomes more pronounced, and the alienation of the events-alienated, more definite". Field enquiries identified most refugees as reactive fate-group, who left in acute refugee movements because of war related factors. Yet, they often stated that they left because of the threat to Islam, perhaps because it is more acceptable in Islamic terms and has become the majority-identified philosophy, which suggests that the hypothesis is true. Furthermore, the difficulty identifying events-alienated refugees in the study population adds further credence to Kunz's proposal.

The evidence collected from field enquiries substantiates Kunz's fifth proposition that refugee vintages are different associative departure and transit cohorts based on political, educational, social, and religious criteria. However, the similarity in backgrounds and attitudes of most refugees made it difficult to identify a variety of vintages, so that only broad groups according to era of flight, were easily recognized. The pre-Russian vintages left Afghanistan in 1978 and 1979 due to the introduction of government decrees and the threat to Islam posed by the new regime, with the second group of vintages comprising refugees who left after Russian intervention, principally because of war conditions. Within each of these broad departure cohorts many smaller vintages, such as the "Sukkur 20s" exist, distinguished by characteristics specified by the refugees.

Kunz (1981:49) proposes that the greater the number of vintages in a refugee settler wave, the more divisive refugee politics will be after settlement. Field experiences did not identify large numbers of vintages in refugee settler waves, and noticed that the political opposition, although not completely harmonious, was unified against the Kabul regime, which suggests that the hypothesis is correct.

It was impossible to determine from field enquiries whether events-alienated refugees have adjusted to settlement in Pakistan quicker than majority-identified refugees, as none of the former were identified in the study population. However, as members of this group rarely have any desire to return home, it is possible that they have concentrated more on settlement in exile than the majority-identified, who have remained focussed on returning to Afghanistan.

Kunz's seventh hypothesis is directed towards events-alienated refugees who arrive in anticipatory movements, and proposes that they make the best settlers. However, as these characteristics are not found in the study population, it is impossible to make further comment.

According to Kunz (1981:51), acute refugee vintages are geographically biased, "reflecting ... the nuances of war, political events and points of exodus". This hypothesis is supported by field enquiries, and substantiated by Sliwinski's (1989:50) data, which shows that provinces have been subjected to different levels of military action, resulting in the depopulation of vast tracts of Afghanistan. These geographical biases in exodus are evident in the data presented in Chapter 2, with the most extensive refugee movements occurring from the Pakistani border region in the early years of the crisis (1978-1980),

followed by migrations from the Kabul region between 1983 and 1985, and from the USSR border region between 1983 and 1986. The exodus of refugees at different stages results in vintages having distinctive geographical, as well as chronological, biases.

Distance, and number of countries crossed, act as a selective factors in refugee movements, according to Kunz's (1981:51) ninth supposition. This is supported by Sliwinski's (1989a:43) evidence, which shows that smaller numbers of refugees have fled from the distant provinces of Afghanistan than those which neighbor Pakistan. Generally, as distance between province of origin and area of asylum increases, there is a corresponding decrease in the proportion of refugees from that province. Furthermore, Sliwinski (1989a:43) has shown that there are higher war-related death rates in these distant provinces.

Kunz's theory predicts that reactive fate-groups that are also minority groups, tend to establish communities which stressed friendship, customs, self-help and ethnic identity. The evidence available from field enquiries supports this hypothesis, as minority communities established along ethnic and linguistic lines were recognized among the study population.

Evidence from field enquiries also supports Kunz's eleventh hypothesis that politically oriented associations are established by majority-identified, reactive fate-groups who supported national independence. Many political organizations have been established by Afghan refugees, and are particularly evident in Peshawar. Kunz argues that these associations are alien to the entire host community, although in Pakistan they are well known in Pakistani political, government and military circles, but not by the ordinary Pakistani. Furthermore, these organizations did not have the low participation rates which Kunz proposes, because membership of them is a pre-requisite for refugee registration, with non-registered refugees also affiliated. Because of universal membership it is difficult to determine whether there was any alienation of non-members.

The evidence from field enquiries supports Kunz's twelfth assumption that homeward oriented activists, such as Afghan refugees, find sympathetic settlement in countries such as Pakistan because such self-sufficient, sanctuary societies do not demand commitment or participation in that society. Pakistan has been a very amiable host society, allowing free settlement, movement and employment of refugees in the country, a rare occurrence compared to other large scale refugee situations, such as Thailand. Pakistani authorities have also turned a "blind eye" to some Afghan activities, particularly those associated with the *mujahideen.*

The absence of events-alienated and self-alienated refugees from the study population makes it difficult to comment on the thirteenth hypothesis that these groups combine to form purpose groups.

Pakistan is not a "monistic society of alien tradition", so that the settlement of Afghan refugees in that country is not applicable to Kunz's (1981:51) fourteenth proposal.

Field enquiries on the flight and settlement of Afghan refugees has been able to support the ten Kunz predictive hypotheses to this scenario. The other five suppositions were either not applicable to the Afghan experience, or none of the refugees in this group were represented in the study population, so further comment was not warranted. Despite the success of the Kunz theory as a predictive model, further work must be conducted on these hypotheses. It is apparent that not all hypotheses are appropriate for all refugee situations, so more research is required to identify when certain proposals are appropriate and when they are not, and why certain responses only occur from particular situations.

SUMMARY

Evidence on the migration of Afghan refugees to Pakistan, and their subsequent settlement in that country was obtained from field enquiries, and supports most of attributes proposed by Kunz (1973, 1981). Despite this success, the question still remains "how useful is the Kunz theory as an explanation of refugee migrations?" In Chapter Five, both the positive and negative aspects of Kunz's theory are identified, and its utility discussed, along with possible future developments.

5

UTILITY AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE KUNZ THEORY

The pitifully slow response by the international community to refugee emergencies in recent years is sufficient justification for identifying improved techniques to assist in the prediction, identification and understanding of involuntary population movements created by man-made disasters. The foundation of this methodology must be a theory of refugee migration, or more correctly, involuntary population movements.

A review of existing typologies, paradigms and theories of involuntary movements in Chapter One found Egon Kunz's kinetic model the most appropriate explanation, covering different facets of refugee flight and settlement. The suitability of this model was then tested in Chapter Four with information collected from field enquiries and secondary data. The final component of this research is to comment on the applicability of this theory, by identifying those components appropriate for explaining the migration of Afghan refugees to Pakistan, and those that are not, together with suggesting other alternatives.

UTILITY OF THE KUNZ THEORY

The displacement, home-related and host-related factors that Kunz identifies as significant elements influencing refugee flight and settlement were found to be appropriate headings under which to examine the Afghan crisis. Field enquiries concluded that most of the study population were what Kunz called acute refugees, who fled Afghanistan in sudden movements, after being subjected to severe *push* factors.

It was difficult to identify any persons as anticipatory refugees, most likely a reflection of the small numbers in this group, and the sudden onset of the crisis. The problem identifying this displacement group is acknowledged by Kunz (1973:131), who states they often resemble ordinary migrants, and adopt the settlement patterns of ordinary migrants rather than those of refugees. Equipped with higher economic and educational qualifications, these refugees have sought refuge in the urban centers of Pakistan, and even overseas, both outside the boundaries of the current study.

It is difficult to classify some of the men interviewed as either anticipatory or acute refugees, because they possess characteristics pertinent to both groups, which suggests that they belong in the third,

intermediate group. Although this is a usual group, the definition is unsatisfactory considering the many different characteristics of millions of refugees.

Instead, anticipatory and acute classifications could be extremes of a continuum, with a number of intermediate variations of anticipatory-acute depending on the varying degrees of fear and *push* factors. A "typical" acute refugee would be a person forced to flee across a border at gun-point, which is 100 percent *push*. A refugee would be placed further left along the continuum (Figure 5.1) as the degree of *push* decreases and perception of fear increases, until reaching the hypothetical anticipatory refugee, who flees solely because of perceived danger, with no actual event contributing as a *push* factor. Although this scale is feasible in theory, it would be difficult to implement in practice due to the problems establishing the validity, or extent, of fear and *push* factors, which are necessary to place refugees correctly on the scale. Despite this drawback, the proposal of a continuum is worthwhile, as it removes the strict boxed categories of Kunz's refugee classifications. As no two refugee situations are alike, the more flexibility that is available in a theory, the more potential it has for explaining refugee situations.

Kunz (1973:134) differentiates refugee migrations from normal migrations by the overwhelming dominance of *push* factors, created by religious persecution, cultural suppression, political oppression, police repression, economic hardship, bloodshed and violence, and warfare (Thomas, nd:Figure 2), and the absence of *pull* factors in the former. This is very apparent in the migration of refugees from Afghanistan, with most men in the study population fleeing because of *push* factors, such as bombardment and ground attacks, which were intentional Soviet depopulation strategies designed to *push* Afghans out of selected areas, and out of the country.

FIGURE 5.1

ANTICIPATORY-ACUTE REFUGEE DISPLACEMENT CONTINUUM

fear

100%................................50%..........................0%

←——————————————————→

extreme anticipatory | intermediate anticipatory | intermediate | intermediate acute | extreme acute

←——————————————————→

push

0%........................50%.......................100%

The migration of Afghan refugees does not exactly follows Kunz's "*push-plunge*" theory of refugees plunging at an offer of settlement. Many refugees fled before the offer of asylum was extended, so that they, and most of who left after this, were not responding to a specific offer, but were seeking a traditional place of refuge. There has been no *plunge* migration, because the Pakistani government has not dictated who may or may not enter, which is generally conducted by issuing visas or landing-permits. Instead, Afghan migration is better described as a "plunge" towards the nearest place of asylum, after conditions in Afghanistan became unbearable.

Although Kunz has argued there is a lack of *pull* factors in acute movements, Thomas (nd:Figure 2) argues that freedom from persecution, oppression and repression, physical safety, military safe haven, economic opportunity and weakened ties to the homeland all attract refugees. The desire to seek shelter in another Islamic country was one *pull* factor identified during field enquiries, albeit minor in comparison to the dominant *push* factors.

Field enquiries found that *pull* factors were more likely to influence the direction of refugee movements after the people had reached safety in Pakistan, with twenty-eight percent (twenty out of ninety-four) of refugees in the study population stating that they chose to come to their current village because former Afghan villagers or family were already living there. A third (thirty-one men) were *pulled* by the prospect of obtaining registration, while a further twenty-one percent (twenty persons) were ordered by the government, in a combined *push-pull* situation.

Kunz's concept of vintages was also confirmed during field enquiries, with the identification of persons commonly called "Sukkur 20s", because they fled Afghanistan because of *mujahideen* attacks on their towns and cities. The term was bestowed by refugees who fled earlier, for religious reasons, which they considered were more significant. Vintages are used by refugees to distinguish themselves, and perhaps the importance of their flight. However, there is some difficulty for outsiders in identify specific vintages, because these are distinguished by characteristics especially pertinent to the refugees, and not always visible.

Theoretically, it is possible to define scores of refugee vintages using different combinations of characteristics, but most of these would be of little benefit. Instead, it is necessary to identify these displacement cohorts using the criteria used by the refugees themselves, which requires researchers to spend considerably more time investigating displacement groups.

The displacement groups proposed by Kunz (1981:140) were found to be a satisfactory method to distinguish different refugees, although the differences between groups were not always evident. This problem can be overcome by improving the definitions of all displacement categories, detailing their characteristics, and what crises each group is likely to result from.

Only three displacement groups were clearly identified in the study population, with most Afghans classified in the "displacement by flight" category. Mass flight refugees, who fled in response to "overwhelming and concentrated *push* situations", were the principal group identified, as Kunz (1973:141) proposed. In addition, there were a handful of refugees in the study population who fled in "individual and group escapes." The third, and final, displacement category recognized is "Army in Flight or Pursuit", which includes six *mujahids* interviewed during field enquiries. Their seasonal movements into Afghanistan to fight, and their subsequent return to Pakistan to rest, is a unique example of this category.

It is apparent that different types of crises will cause refugee emergencies, each with their distinctive displacement categories, and it is unlikely that all eleven of Kunz's displacement categories would be identified in any one refugee crisis. Therefore, additional research should be directed at identifying what groups result from particular emergencies, and why they occur.

The second component of Kunz's theory is three groups of host-related factors, each which were found to be appropriate classifications for describing refugee flight and settlement behavior. The first of these is the identification and marginality of refugees, which describes the social relationship of refugees with the population in the home country. All refugees interviewed during field enquiries were majority-identified refugees, because they shared a strong and unified opposition to the events that had occurred in Afghanistan, and identified themselves enthusiastically with the country, although not the government. This solidarity was reinforced by the attitudes of refugees to repatriation, with every person wanting to return to Afghanistan, but no one would go until after the current government was overthrown and a new government installed.

"Events-alienated" refugees, the second identification group proposed by Kunz (1981:43), were absent from the study population. Although they do not share the same sentiments as their former compatriots, they did not migrate because of events preceding the refugee crisis, or because of past discrimination, but due to events associated with the war. According to Kunz this group seldom expresses the desire to return, which was very evident among those refugees interviewed.

The term "events-alienated" continues to be very confusing term when describing Afghan refugee movements, as the alienation of refugees due to specific events was evident among most of the men interviewed. However, this is not the alienation proposed by Kunz, and without a thorough understanding of his terminology, it is easy to incorrectly classify persons in this group. It would be beneficial to users of this theory if a more appropriate term could be derived to describe this particular refugee group, perhaps something like "persecuted minorities."

The third and final identification group is self-alienated refugees, who were also absent from the study population, although they may exist

in the larger refugee community. According to Kunz's (1981:43) definition, these persons fled because of strong ideological motives, and do not associate themselves with their home country. Although migration due to ideological considerations is appropriate to those Afghans interviewed during field enquiries, there is no lack of attachment to their home, so the argument can not be substantiated.

The second home-related factor classifies refugees according to their attitude to flight, with the research successfully able to identify reactive fate-groups, self-fulfilling purpose groups, and groups of revolutionary activists in the study population. Most of the Afghan men interviewed during field enquiries belong in the reactive fate-group, because their flight from Afghanistan was made reluctantly, only after conditions within the country had been made unbearable by the widespread destruction of houses, crops and land, accompanied by many deaths. The reactive fate-group refugees also belong in the majority-identified group, as Kunz (1981:44) postulates in his theory.

Far smaller numbers of refugees in the study population belong in the purpose groups, the most noticeable being the six *mujahids* interviewed, who fit Kunz's (1981:45) revolutionary activists label due to their active opposition against the Kabul regime. There were also five other men who mentioned during discussions that they had previously fought against the Kabul government, although they now remained in Pakistan. Although no longer actively engaged in the war, their attitudes towards the Kabul regime had not changed. In the larger Afghan refugee community, there are also the active members of the political parties, who also belong to this group.

Field enquiries revealed that many of the men interviewed are self-fulfilling refugees, who fled Afghanistan on account of their strong religious motivations, which were incompatible with those espoused by Kabul, but which they could continue in asylum in Pakistan.

It is difficult to determine exactly how many refugees in the study population belonged in each category, because some men exhibit characteristics applicable to both the reactive fate-groups and the purpose groups. The displacement of refugees in reaction to sudden revolutionary change, classifies them as reactive fate-group, whereas the dramatic change in Afghan society proved unacceptable, and identifies them as purpose group. The situation is further complicated by some reactive fate-group refugees expressing the same ideals as self-fulfilling purpose groups, especially that their current home society was inconsistent with their desired society. The objective of all the refugees was to change the society within Afghanistan to allow their return, which meant the overthrow of Najibullah and the establishment of an Islamic regime.

An explanation for this dual classification could be that some of the study population who are classified as reactive fate-group refugees also adopted the attitudes of the self-fulfilling purpose groups, with their original reasons for flight becoming submerged in the religious and political fervor initiated by the refugee leaders. Some refugees may

express Islamic ideology as a reason for migration because it is an expected sentiment espoused by the political and religious leaders in exile. Because refugees wanted to, or were expected to, associate with this group, they reiterated the religious reasons for flight. Consequently, many of the men interviewed who express Islamic motivations as a reason for migration may have adopted these views after they had settled in Pakistan. Changing or obscured motivations for migration is expected when interviewing refugees often up to twelve years after their flight to asylum. This problem can be eliminated by early and continued research on motivations for migration among refugee populations.

The Ideological-national orientation of refugees in exile was difficult to determine in some instances, due to the lack of definitions of some groups. Despite this obstacle, two of the six categories were evident in the study population. Once again the Afghan refugee crisis is found to be a unique example of refugee behavior, because the ideologies held by revolutionary activists, including *mujahideen* and political leaders, is not different from principal ideologies, as Kunz (1981:46) suggests, but is actually considered mainstream.

Another unique situation in the Afghanistan refugee crisis is that revolutionary activists are also restoration activists, (although not all restoration activists are revolutionaries), because they are fighting to restore previous political structures. Different restoration activist groups are evident in the study population, with some refugees wanting to restore the monarchy of King Zahir Shah, while others prefer a presidential democracy such as existed with President Mohammed Daoud.

Of the other four orientation groups, only the passive hurt could be identified in the study population, although others probably exist in the larger refugee community. There are those that have assimilated into the host society and are achieving material success, particularly evident among some refugees in the cities. There was no evidence of self-alienated founders of ideological idealist colonies during field enquiries. Kunz's also proposes that there are those "realists seeking the way to an integrated accommodation with the host society which is consistent both with their past and present roles", but fails to provide further information by which to identify these refugees.

The most important influence on refugee settlement was cultural compatibility, which was the first of the host-related factors identified by Kunz (1981:46). Migration, and subsequent settlement, of Afghan refugees in Pakistan is a classic example of cultural compatibility between host and refugee, which can largely be explained by the existence of *Pushtunwali*, the heterogeneous cultural system of the Pushtun people who comprised eighty percent of the total refugee population.

Religion was found to be the most important of these cultural factors, with Islam the common factor of all Afghan tribes and their Pakistani hosts. The deep historical and religious importance that Islam places on refugee flight and asylum, was a dominant factor in the

settlement of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, influencing the behavior of both refugee and host societies.

Language is a second cultural factor which Kunz (1981:47) identifies, which is also evident in the case study. Fortunately, for three-quarters of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan, they share a common language of Pushtu, which minimizes some problems. However, during field enquiries it was recognized that language barriers do create problems of settlement for many non-Pushtu speaking refugees, such as Jelad, a university-educated engineer, who discussed how his employment opportunities in Pakistan were severely restricted by his lack of Urdu, the national and governmental, language of Pakistan. Although he had the educational qualifications, he lacked the linguistic ability to obtain employment.

The *Pushtunwali* incorporates many other components which Kunz (1981:47) proposes, such as values, traditions, and politics. Most Afghan refugees who have fled to Pakistan are Pushtun, and their settlement has been assisted by the operation of the same cultural code in Pakistan as what existed in Afghanistan. Furthermore, many non-Pushtun refugees from Afghanistan are aware of *Pushtunwali*, as Pushtuns were previously the dominant tribe of Afghanistan, and their customs widely known.

The importance of population policies in the settlement of refugee populations is also recognized by Kunz (1981:49), with some procedures noticeable in the settlement of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. However, these policies are not in accordance with those proposed for an overpopulated country such as Pakistan, which Kunz (1981:48) argues is unlikely to accept large numbers of refugees. Yet Pakistan, which is the ninth most populous country in the world with a population exceeding 110 million, has allowed the free settlement of nearly four million Afghan refugees. This migration is probably a reflection of the dominance that cultural factors, particularly religion, have played in the formation of population policies.

Host-related factors are correctly identified by Kunz (1981:48) as important factors which influence refugee settlement, but the population policies and social receptiveness factors are directed more towards resettlement in third countries of asylum than initial refugee settlement, which is evident when he discusses the "... acceptance of an offer of settlement overseas" (Kunz, 1973:134). Initial refugee flight is rarely dependent on an offer of settlement overseas, which is more likely to occur in resettlement situations when visas are issued. This view is further justified by the title of the second component of Kunz's (1981) theory, "Exile and Resettlement." Therefore, considerably more research is required on the influence of population policies and social receptiveness in initial refugee movements.

The most important population policy enacted by the Pakistani government was to allow Afghan refugees to settle freely within Pakistan, although insisting that they must eventually return. However, recent developments in Pakistan have called for Afghan refugees to be

"push-permit" model, where choice of destination reflects the availability of a landing permit.

The second type of refugee migration, the acute, arises from sudden changes such as occur as the result of political and/or military coups. In these situations, the push component is dominant and the major emphasis is on flight - *en masse*, in groups, as individuals - to find asylum in a neighboring or nearby country. Although earlier literature had summarized acute refugee movements as following the "push-pressure-pull" model, Kunz (1973:134) recognized that little or no "pull" was involved, despite a strong "push" component and intense "pressure". Instead, he saw acute movement as following a sequence of "push-pressure-plunge", where refugees plunge at an offer of resettlement (Figure 1.4).

Although the basis of all refugee movements is fear for personal safety, it is "the individual's interpretation of events and self-perceived danger ... which motivates the refugee and justifies his stand" (Kunz, 1973:137). This perception of danger varies widely: "While the refugee of today leaves, the refugee of tomorrow endeavors to stall off further advance". That individuals leave their home countries at different stages, in response to such varying perceptions Kunz (1973:138) labelled "vintages". Essentially, these are associative departure and transit cohorts that unite people who have shared the same experiences before and during displacement, and who often hold common views and attitudes (Figure 1.4). In contrast to anticipatory refugee movements, ones that are acute were more likely to include a variety of vintages, with each distinctly different in character, background and avowed political faith" (Kunz, 1973:138).

Home-related factors are the second set which influence refugee migrations. Kunz (1981:43-4) found that refugees could be grouped according to their degree of identification or marginality. The first and most common group known as "majority-identified" refugees, identify themselves with the home nation but do not support its government and feel that this opposition is shared by most compatriots.

The second group, known as "events-alienated", are refugees often comprised of religious or racial minorities, who had wanted to be identified by the home nation but had previously been rejected by all or part. As a result of this rebuff, they do not share the same sentiments as their former compatriots. The best known example of this group, according to Kunz (1981:44), are the German Jews during World War II who, "despite being deeply rooted in German culture, became unwanted aliens in their homeland." These unwanted aliens, unlike "majority-identified" refugees, have little desire to return and live among their former country folk and often become permanently separated from their homeland. The third group of refugees, known as exiles, are "self-alienated" persons who no longer identify with their former nation for various personal reasons and philosophies, and consequently have opted for a life in voluntary exile.

given citizenship of Pakistan, a extraordinary change in policy directions, with substantial ramifications.

A significant cultural factor is evident in the formation of refugee-related population policies, as the government of Pakistan is expected to accept Afghan refugees in accordance with the Islamic tradition, which it has done admirably. As Kunz (1981:47) insinuates, but does not detail, population policies are more likely to encourage the settlement of refugees who possess strong cultural links with the host community, and is rarely promoted when displaced populations do not possess some strong cultural connections with the host society.

An important use of population policies in Pakistan has been to influence the direction of refugee movements, particularly the refugee registration system. The government has influenced the directions of refugee movements within the country by opening registration in various locations at different times. Furthermore, the Pakistani government has also been forced to relocate entire RTVs to new locations, in response to serious environmental degradation caused by the additional population pressures. Three of the refugees interviewed revealed that one entire refugee village was relocated by the government following disturbances between Pakistanis and local Afghan refugee population. By allowing the settlement of refugees along the Afghan/Pakistan border, the Pakistani government created a buffer zone comprised of a hostile warrior community, to deter further Soviet advancement.

The final host related factor is social receptiveness, where Kunz briefly discusses three types of societies - monistic (assimilationist), pluralistic (integrationist) and tolerant. Pakistan is a tolerant, multi-ethnic society, dominated by four major ethic groups - Punjabi, Sindhi, Pushtun and Baluchi - and has not forced, nor expected, any assimilation or integration of the refugee population. Pakistan's role as a host society is assisted by the traditions expected in the Islamic religion, and is reinforced by strong cultural ties that previously existed between refugees and hosts in certain areas of Pakistan, so that there was little need for assimilation or integration.

A major criticism of Kunz's theory is that many parts of the terminology are not adequately defined, leaving terms open to interpretation. This deficiency must be corrected by defining fully every refugee group mentioned in the theory, together with providing details on what refugees are likely to comprise each group, and when particular groups are likely to evolve.

This research would also solve the problem found during field enquiries where refugees were often classified into two host-related groups. Kunz did not detail whether this was likely in most refugee situations, or whether it is a unique to the Afghan crisis. Nevertheless, it reflects the need for more detailed definition of all the refugee groups proposed by Kunz.

Unfortunately, the population policies and social receptiveness of host societies that Kunz describes are directed more towards resettlement of refugees to countries of third asylum rather than initial

settlement. Host related factors are crucial elements of refugee settlement, but differ according to the type of settlement movement, a problem which researchers must now identify.

Kunz has not recognized that geographical location of host and asylum countries influences the population policies enacted by different countries. Recent refugee displacements have primarily occurred between adjoining countries, such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, or Ethiopia and Sudan, with only occasional movements between non-adjoining countries. Different policies initiatives are therefore required to manage movements between bordering countries, where large numbers of refugees arrive daily by foot or local transport, than between distant countries, where arrivals are fewer and easier to police.

A comparison of policy responses by various countries to refugee influxes is another area requiring further investigation. Further to Kunz's idea of social receptiveness, researchers need to identify the underlying factors which influence government refugee policies, from offering asylum to preventing arrivals. In addition, the settlement of refugees within countries of asylum is often influenced by government policies, the reasons for which need to be explained.

Despite some limitations in the theory, the investigation of Afghan refugees in Pakistan successfully identifies the three groups of displacement, home, and host related factors which form the basis of the theory. It also recognizes that refugee displacements are unique population movements with many distinctive influencing factors, which are not always present in every refugee situation. What is required is to identify when each of factors is present, why they evolve, and what impact they have on the refugee movements.

Although Kunz's theory is not ideal, it remains the most appropriate explanation of refugee migrations, because it correctly identifies and encompasses many different facets of flight and settlement. If the weaknesses in the theory mentioned above can be overcome, then its capacity to explain refugee movements will improve considerably.

AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Possible applications for Kunz's theory are numerous, and include assisting bureaucrats in the identification and selection of refugees for asylum and resettlement programs, using the displacement and home-related classifications. The identification of displaced persons into different groups within the theory, may assist bureaucrats evaluating applications for refugee status.

A logical and necessary advancement of Kunz's theory is to develop a predictive theory of refugee migration to alert the international community about population movements emanating from man-made disasters.

Gordenker (1986:171) proposes two applications for the "early warning of disastrous population movements", one of which is particularly appropriate for Kunz's theory. He (1986:171) argues the

early detection of refugee movements already in progress, and the subsequent introduction of appropriate policy measures, could reduce the number of people involved in these flows, together with improved relief efforts to those people who have already fled. This appears to be a logical development of Kunz's theory, where anticipatory refugees are quickly identified, and programs introduced to slow, or even prevent, the flow of acute refugees. Furthermore, emergency relief operations could be implemented sooner to assist with the settlement of acute refugee populations.

The application of an Afghan refugee case study to Kunz's theory has shown that this is a suitable theoretical foundation of involuntary population movements, which can be improved once the deficiencies identified above have been corrected. Further research on the predictive hypotheses of the theory to encompass all possible types of refugee movements will enhance the work considerably. This could be achieved by researching past and present refugee migrations, using the different classifications and factors which have been identified by Kunz. With a greater knowledge of the factors which contributed to past refugee displacements, researchers will be better equipped to predict the behavior of future refugee populations.

Kunz's theory could be developed further by incorporating existing research and refugee typologies, such as the factors Kliot (1987) and Zolberg and Suhrke (nd, cited in Keely, 1984) argue initiate refugee movements. Kliot (1987:110) identifies six causal agents which have provoked most major refugee movements that have occurred since 1970, including:

i. anticolonial wars, wars of independence and self-determination movements;
ii. international conflicts;
iii. revolutions, *coup d'etats*, changes of governments;
iv. ethnic and tribal conflicts;
v. partition of states;
vi. population transfers and population expulsion.

In addition to these six classifications, Zolberg and Suhrke (cited in Keely, 1984:3-5) add two other factors:

vii. state terrorism[10]; and
viii. developmental authoritarianism[11].

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[10] State terrorism or state sanctioned violence. Zolberg and Suhrke (cited in Keely, 1984:4) noted that because it is difficult to identify the offenders of state sanctioned violence, together with the randomness of the attacks and the poor economic conditions that exist in these countries, the refugees are often mistaken as voluntary refugees.

[11] Development authoritarianism is where authoritarian "short cuts" which are enforced to overcome the constraints of underdevelopment create refugee situations.

These eight classifications encompass most population displacements likely to occur from man-made disasters, and form the beginning of a predictive refugee migration theory, with each conflict producing distinctive *push* factors that need to be identified. The seven *push* factors and corresponding *pull* factors identified by Thomas (nd:8; Figure 5.2) would be appropriate in most of the above conflicts.

FIGURE 5.2

THOMAS' MODEL OF DIASPORA FORMATION

HOMELAND

PUSH FACTORS	*PULL FACTORS*
Religious persecution	New government policies
Cultural suppression	New government
Political oppression	Foreign troop withdrawal
Police repression	End of hostilities
Economic hardship	Amnesty
Bloodshed, violence	Improving economy
Warfare	
FLIGHT	**REPATRIATION**

HOST COUNTRY 1

PULL FACTORS	*PUSH FACTORS*
Freedom from persecution	Local hostility
Freedom from oppression	Lack of security
Freedom from repression	Poverty
Physical safety	Lack of eco. opportunity
Military safe haven	Lack of asylum
Economic opportunity	Lack of citizenship
Weakened ties to homeland	Military draft
MIGRATION	

HOST COUNTRY 2 ...n

PULL FACTORS	*PUSH FACTORS*
Economic opportunities	(Same as above)
Citizenship	
Asylum	
More freedom	
Preceding migrants	

Source: Thomas, nd:3

Thomas (nd:3) also proposes that *push* and *pull* factors are evident in other refugee movements, including repatriation and resettlement. He argues *push* factors emanate from countries of asylum in both repatriation and resettlement migrations, with repatriation influenced by *pull* factors from the home country, while resettlement movements are motivated by *pull* factors originating from a third country.

The distinctive combination of social, political, and economic characteristics in every country results in each causal conflict producing particular *push* factors, which generate refugee migrations with distinctive characteristics, in terms of displacement types, identification/marginality and attitude to flight. Kunz's theory can be applied to further identify and classify these refugee populations.

Anticipatory refugees are the first refugees to flee a crisis, and although some of their characteristics have been provided by Kunz, more detailed research is required to identify additional social and demographic characteristics, together with behavioral patterns. Currently, it is not known whether different causal factors will generate multiple types of anticipatory refugees. Any differences between groups of anticipatory refugees, and the reasons for these differences, are topics for further research.

Although Kunz mentions the difficulty identifying anticipatory refugees, because of their resemblance to ordinary migrants, the utility of the theory as a predictive tool is partly dependent on the ability to identify this particular refugee group, as their early identification enhances the prediction and detection of the eleven groups of acute refugees proposed in the theory. These larger, and ill-prepared, groups of acute refugees present the greatest problems to host communities, and must be the focus of future research.

The Afghan case study shows that not all eleven acute displacement groups will be evident in any single refugee crisis, so that researchers need to investigate the displacement groups emanating from the eight different causal factors. In addition, they need to examine why certain types of displacement groups originate from certain causal situations, and why others are absent, so that the flow of different displacement groups from impending crises may be predicted. Additional information on the characteristics of these displacement groups would be particularly useful to members of the international community providing emergency relief.

By identifying the different components of refugee populations in terms of Kunz's home-related factors, and proposing their behavior in exile in terms of marginality, attitude towards displacement and ideological-orientation in exile, emergency coordinators may be aided with the planning of refugee settlements.

Similar research is required on the response of refugees to different host-related factors. The current study has reinforced Kunz's (1981:46) finding that cultural compatibility is an exceptionally important element in the settlement of refugee populations. However, not all refugee movements occur to culturally compatible environments.

Therefore, researchers need to investigate the settlement behavior of refugees when there is little cultural compatibility between displaced and host populations. Unique refugee experiences will develop in these situations that need to be identified, so that appropriate programs and policies can be developed.

Population policies enacted by governments are extremely important factors in the migration and settlement of refugee populations, yet have aroused only limited interest from researchers. Hidden reasons often underlie the true reasons why certain policies are adopted, including racial discrimination. Howe (1990) argues that racial bias is evident in the selection of some refugee populations for settlement in Malaysia, while other displaced populations have been rejected for settlement, and housed in transit camps, because of racial discrimination. Turkey's reluctance to accept Kurdish refugees from Iraq is an example of the opposition to refugee settlement on ethnic grounds, because it would have increased the Kurdish minority population within that country.

Many countries have adopted "humane deterrence" policies to deter the arrival of refugee populations. Gordenker (1987:159) argues the United States implemented gunboat diplomacy to stop the arrival of Haitian refugees in that country, by intercepting refugee boats at sea by the Coast Guard and returning the refugees to Haiti, despite their protests and the illegality of such actions.

The identification of problems with refugee movements occasionally results in the implementation of more sympathetic population policies, such as the orderly departure programs that were introduced to alleviate problems associated with the departure of refugees from Cuba and Vietnam.

The various population policies adopted by countries of asylum, together with the factors which influenced their formation, is a warranted topic for further study. Furthermore, alternative policies which influence refugee repatriation and resettlement need examination. Despite the many policy initiatives that are being initiated to handle displaced populations, there is only limited research on this topic. Governments that impose suppressive population policies are often hesitant to allow the investigation of their refugees populations or government policies, which hinders such research objectives.

Social receptiveness is an important component in the settlement of refugee populations, with many, mainly underdeveloped, countries showing remarkable resilience in accepting large refugee flows. Unfortunately, developed countries show far less interest in sharing the burdens associated with these displaced populations, and impose very strict guidelines for accepting refugee populations, either in initial refugee migrations or in resettlement migrations. As mentioned in Chapter One, developed countries have preferred to accept the better educated, more skilled refugees, and leave the poor, uneducated, aged and invalid refugees in those first asylum nations least equipped to assist. Why are the developed countries hesitant to accept greater

refugee populations, especially when they are better equipped with the resources to handle these populations? Are there any ethnic, social or religious biases in the acceptance of refugees, especially for resettlement to developed countries? These are all questions worthy of further research.

There has been an increase in recent years in research of the integration and adaptation of refugee populations following resettlement, particularly the study of resettled Vietnamese refugee populations in the United States, Canada, and Australia. However, far less study is devoted to the problems of integration and adaptation of refugees in countries of first asylum, especially in underdeveloped countries.

CONCLUSION

Unfortunately, there has been a constant increase in the global refugee population in recent years. If the international community wishes to alleviate some of the problems associated with these displaced populations, then it must devote more resources to the investigation of the experiences of flight and settlement. Only after research is directed towards the problems associated with refugee migrations, will solutions be found.

The examination of Egon Kunz's theory through the Afghan refugee case study has shown that it is a satisfactory foundation on which a theory of refugee migration could be built. The central components of the theory, the displacement, home-related and host-related factors, are significant components which enable the identification of different groups within refugee populations, including the Afghans.

Researchers have an opportunity to use this theory in their analysis of past and present refugee situations, to investigate the components of refugee flows. Kunz's theory offers a chance for researchers to describe these involuntary population movements using the same terms, instead of proposing a myriad of vague names.

The field of refugee studies is only a recent addition to the academic arena, relying on an interdisciplinary perspective, encompassing all of the disciplines in the social sciences, together with the medical and health sciences. Members of the geography discipline are well-placed to make a substantial contribution to the further study of refugee populations, because of their dominant tradition in migration research.

However, the discipline can not afford to rest on past laurels, so population geographers must devote greater energy to the problems of refugee migrations. They can no longer be satisfied simply identifying refugee flows between different countries, as occasionally occurred in the past, but must contribute to the understanding of why these population movements occur. Population geographers of today can build upon the traditions of their predecessors, such as Eichenbaum, Rogge and Kliot, as well as other social scientists like Kunz, Richmond and Petersen, to develop the theories necessary to understand refugee migrations. It will

only be after the dynamics of refugee flight and settlement are better understood, that researchers, including geographers, will be able to develop the solutions required to alleviate the problems of refugee populations.

APPENDIX 1

LETTER OF AUTHORIZATION

Office of the
Commissioner Afghan Refugees,
NWFP, Peshawar.

NO. ACR(L)/16873-79
Dated: Peshawar 22/7/1990.


The Commissioner Afghan Refugees has been pleased to allow Mr. Paul Foley, Graduate Student, University of Hawaii to visit and interview Afghan Refugees, and the Commissionerate Staff in the following camps for research purposes on the dates mentioned against each. All concerned District Administrators and Village Administrators are requested to extend all help and security during the period of his visit:-

1.	Kacha Ghari Camp at Peshawar-I.		28.7	to	29.7	(2 days)
2.	Nasir Bagh at Peshawar I.		30.7	to	2.8	(4 days)
3.	Jalala Camp at Mardan.		4.8	to	6.8	(3 days)
4.	Baghicha	-do-	7.8	to	9.8	(3 days)
5.	Zangal Patii at Malakand.		11.8	to	12.8	(2 days)
6.	Koga camp at Swat.		14.8	to	16.8	(3 days)
7.	Azakhel at Peshawar II.		18.8	to	20.8	(3 days)
8.	Hawai	-do-	21.8	to	23.8	(3 days)
9.	Ghazi camp at Abbottabad.		25.8	to	27.8	(3 days)
10.	Panian	-do-	28.8	to	30.8	(3 days)

ZIARAT KHAN
Additional Commissioner (Relief)
Afghan Refugees, NWFP, Peshawar.

FIGURE 1.4

KUNZ'S MODEL OF POPULATION MOVEMENT



Source: Kunz, 1981:50

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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Hejrat:
THE MIGRATION OF AFGHAN REFUGEES TO PAKISTAN, 1978-1990

Paul Foley

HEJRAT: THE MIGRATION OF AFGHAN REFUGEES TO PAKISTAN, 1978-1990

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS
IN
GEOGRAPHY

DECEMBER 1991

By Paul Foley

Thesis Committee:

Murray Chapman, Chairperson
Brian Murton
Robert Gardner

We certify that we have read this thesis and that, in our opinion, it is satisfactory in scope and quality as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Geography.

THESIS COMMITTEE

Murray Chapman
Chairperson

Brian Murton

Robert Gardner

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